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Abstract:  University technology transfer activities have become increasingly important 
as a source of information dissemination and revenue since the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act in 1980. A two-equation recursive model and technology transfer data from the 
Statistics Access for Tech Transfer (STATT) published by the Association of Technology 
Managers (AUTM) for the years 2008-2012, North America’s High-Tech Economy: The 
Geography of Knowledge-Based Industries published by the Milken Institute based on 
the year 2007, A Data-Based Assessment of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United 
States by the National Research Council based on the academic year 2005-2006, and 
university intellectual property policies are used to explain variation in technology 
disclosures and outputs from technology transfer efforts across 86 U.S. research 
universities. Technology transfer outputs include the number of licenses executed, 
licenses generating income, cumulative active licenses, and licensing income. The 
following factors enhance university technology disclosures: high quality faculty, 
technology transfer office staff size, and research expenditures. This study also found that 
technology disclosures are not positively related to revenue sharing incentives to 
university scientists. The  results suggest that technology transfer outputs are significantly 
related to number of technology disclosures. 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1 
 
 Policy changes .........................................................................................................1 
 Funding trends .........................................................................................................4 
 Problem solving .......................................................................................................4 
 Entrepreneurial thinking ..........................................................................................5 
 University technology transfer .................................................................................7 
 Research objectives ................................................................................................11 
 Data trends .............................................................................................................12 
  
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES ......................................17 
  
 Theoretical framework ...........................................................................................17 
 Hypothesis 1...........................................................................................................20 
 Hypothesis 2...........................................................................................................21 
 Hypothesis 3...........................................................................................................21 
 Hypothesis 4...........................................................................................................21 
 Hypothesis 5...........................................................................................................21 
 Hypothesis 6...........................................................................................................22 
 Hypothesis 7...........................................................................................................22 
 Hypothesis 8...........................................................................................................23 
 Hypothesis 9...........................................................................................................23 
 Hypothesis 10.........................................................................................................23 
 Hypothesis 11.........................................................................................................23 
 Hypothesis 12.........................................................................................................24 
 
III. METHODS ............................................................................................................25 
 
 Technology transfer process ..................................................................................25 
 Technology disclosures ..........................................................................................25 
 TTO output.............................................................................................................28 
  
vi 
 
 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
IV. DATA ....................................................................................................................31 
 
 Data introduction ...................................................................................................31 
 AUTM data ............................................................................................................32 
 National Research Council data .............................................................................34 
 Milken Institute data ..............................................................................................36 
 Other data sources ..................................................................................................38 
 
V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS ........................................................................................46 
 
 Technology disclosures model ...............................................................................46 
 TTO output models ................................................................................................49 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ..........................................59 
 
 Technology disclosures conclusions ......................................................................59 
 TTO output conclusions .........................................................................................61 
 Implications for further research ............................................................................63 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................66 
 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................69 
 
 I – Universities included in study ..........................................................................69 
 II – Ph.D.-granting science departments in study ..................................................72 
 III – Metropolitan area tech pole scores ................................................................73 
 IV – Net licensing income distribution to inventor ...............................................75 
 V – Correlation coefficients for TTO output equations .........................................78 
 VI – Calculation details .........................................................................................79 
 VII – SAS code ......................................................................................................80 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table           Page 
 
1.1 Summary of empirical research on university technology transfer, 2000-present ..9 
2.1 Characteristics of university technology transfer stakeholders .............................19 
2.2 Null and alternative hypotheses for technology disclosures ..................................22 
2.3 Null and alternative hypotheses for TTO outputs ..................................................24 
4.1 Milken Institute Tech Pole Scores .........................................................................38 
4.2 Examples of net licensing income distribution to inventor ...................................42 
5.1 Descriptive statistics for technology disclosures model ........................................47 
5.2 Correlation coefficients for technology disclosures model ...................................48 
5.3 Technology disclosures regression results .............................................................49 
5.4 Descriptive statistics for independent variables in TTO output equations ............50 
5.5 Descriptive statistics for dependent variables in TTO output equations ...............51 
5.6 Correlation coefficients for dependent variables in TTO output equations ...........51 
5.7 Licenses executed and licensing income regression results ..................................52 
5.8 Licenses generating income and cumulative active licenses regression results ....55 
5.9 TTO output models summary ................................................................................56 
6.1 Technology disclosures hypotheses support ..........................................................60 
6.2 TTO output hypotheses support .............................................................................62 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
 
1.1 Technology transfer stakeholders ............................................................................6 
1.2 Average technology disclosures, TTO FTEs, and Total Research Expenditures ..13 
1.3 Average number of licenses executed ....................................................................14 
1.4 Average licensing income ......................................................................................15 
1.5 Average number of licenses generating income ....................................................15 
1.6 Average number of cumulative active licenses .....................................................16 
3.1 Technology transfer model ....................................................................................27 
4.1 University locations ...............................................................................................32 
4.2 Oklahoma universities’ technology disclosures.....................................................25 
4.3 Oklahoma universities’ TTO FTEs ........................................................................26 
4.4 Oklahoma universities’ total research expenditures ..............................................27 
4.5 Oklahoma universities’ licenses executed .............................................................28 
4.6 Oklahoma universities’ licensing revenue .............................................................29 
4.7 Oklahoma universities’ licenses generating income ..............................................30 
4.8 Oklahoma universities’ licenses with equity .........................................................31 
4.9 Oklahoma universities’ cumulative active licenses ...............................................32 
4.10 Oklahoma universities’ start-ups .........................................................................33 
4.11 National Research Council data ...........................................................................36 
4.12 Additional descriptive statistics for Oklahoma universities ................................45 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF EQUATIONS 
 
Equation          Page 
 
3.1 Technology disclosures equation ...........................................................................28 
3.2 TTO output equation ..............................................................................................29 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Policy changes 
 
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed research universities to retain 
ownership of intellectual property developed using federal research funds. Bayh-Dole 
was meant to increase patent and innovation activity in federally funded projects by 
allowing the institution creating technology from federally funded research the 
opportunity to retain ownership of the intellectual property (IP). The ownership and the 
potential for promoting technology commercialization offer additional technology 
licensing revenue potential for universities receiving federal funding. Universities have 
created technology transfer offices to pursue these opportunities so that revenues from 
licensing can be created and invested in academic research (Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, & 
Link, 2004). 
 Further case law expanded licensing opportunities, particularly for land-grant 
institutions with strengths in plant and animal sciences. Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 
allowed the patenting of living tissue. This decision, paired with the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980, allowed institutions conducting federally funded research to record technological 
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advances in fields involving living tissue while simultaneously opening new avenues of 
potential funding for future research, scholarship, or extension efforts in land-grant 
universities. Since the events of 1980, biotechnology has exploded; more than 70 percent 
of the processed foods sold in the United States today contain some biotechnology 
products (Robinson & Medlock, 2005). In the Robinson and Medlock (2005) study, the 
term biotechnology encompasses technologies from the genetic manipulation of 
microorganisms to transgenic animals and human gene sequences. It is impossible to 
know if biotechnology would have advanced in the last 30-plus years like it has without 
Bayh-Dole and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, but the effect of the two together has been 
dramatic. The developments of 1980 were especially beneficial to land-grant universities 
since it allowed them to patent technologies discovered through federally funded research 
and potentially profit from the agricultural research, the same research conducted since 
the inception of land-grant universities with the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862. The 
potential of an additional income stream via federally funded research is extremely 
attractive to land-grant universities, especially considering that the bulk of agricultural 
research is supported by formula (Hatch) funds or via federal research grants. 
There are many schools of thought on the results of Bayh-Dole. Some see the 
results of Bayh-Dole as a hindrance to basic research as faculty pursue applied research 
necessary for patents (Thorp & Goldstein, 2013), or may have to postpone their basic 
research in order to work further on a patented technology to ready it for the open market. 
Product development allows the technology to be applied and may be best done by the 
faculty member with specialized knowledge of the technology they developed (Thursby 
& Thursby, 2004). Critics of patents cite that the traditional path of information 
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dissemination through publication allows companies to use technologies without 
licensing and allows faculty to focus on research (Thursby & Thursby, 2004). However, 
others credit the ability to patent and license technologies for increased patenting and 
contend that it offers universities a method to keep and retain engaged faculty. By 
making it easier for faculty to obtain patents, negotiate licensing deals, and establish 
start-up companies, universities have kept faculty engaged in their research, connected to 
their field, and less likely to leave (Thorp & Goldstein, 2013). 
Land-grant universities, because of their research, teaching, and extension 
missions, have always supported applied research and may have the specialists required 
to work both on the basic sciences as well as the application of the science to real-world 
problem solving. As a result, advancing research to the point that it can be applied should 
be a natural component of the research and extension mission of land-grant universities. 
While a select few universities began patenting long before 1980 (e.g. California-
Berkely, MIT, Stanford), many began patenting just after the passage of Bayh-Dole, and 
universities dramatically increased their share of patents post Bayh-Dole (Shane, 2004). 
Additionally, since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, every research university 
has created a technology transfer office (TTO) to facilitate commercialization of 
technology developed at each university and to generate licensing and licensing income 
for the university (Thorp & Goldstein, 2013). Patents granted to research universities 
have increased by over 1,000 percent since 1980, doubling from 1980-1998, and again 
from 1998-2012 (USPTO, 2013).
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Funding trends 
 Barring a reversal of funding trends, land-grant universities in the United States 
must operate on decreased public funding and increase the efficiency and originality of 
the research they conduct (Thorp & Goldstein, 2013). State support for public colleges 
has been declining for at least 25 years (“25 Years”, 2014). The two research universities 
in Oklahoma, Oklahoma State University and the University of Oklahoma, experienced a 
decreased share of revenue from state support by 10 and 11 percent, respectively from 
1987 to 2012 (“25 Years”, 2014). This downturn in funding has occurred all while 
enrollment has sharply increased (Lederman, 2013). Increasing the educational burden is 
only one difficulty these universities face as we look to these research institutions to aid 
in advancing technology and contribute to the solution of complex problems. In order to 
continually produce exceptional research, universities have pursued additional means of 
funding such as federal and private grants, endowments, and private partnerships. Now 
more than ever, these funding sources and other supporters are seeking a measureable 
return on their investment (Thorp & Goldstein, 2013). 
Problem solving 
 Advancing technology brings with it the capacity to potentially solve larger and 
more complex problems. These real-world problems cross all traditional disciplinary 
boundaries, and the people charged with solving these problems should not be 
constrained by traditional mechanisms for ordering knowledge, i.e. traditional disciplines 
as determined by university organizational structure (Thorp & Goldstein, 2013). The top 
100 research universities are awarded close to 80 percent of federal research funds with 
the top 20 universities garnering roughly one-third of all federal funds (Thorp & 
5 
 
Goldstein, 2013). Many of the top universities have adopted an entrepreneurial mindset 
from the President though the department heads, and several have created 
entrepreneurship centers or departments to synthesize research from all disciplines. It is 
this entrepreneurial bent of university administrators that is the primary source of growth 
in university licensing and licensing income, not necessarily a change in research 
(Thursby & Thursby, 2004). While it is extremely difficult to evaluate the effectiveness 
of an “entrepreneurial” mindset or methods, technological breakthroughs can be 
examined through technology disclosures, patent applications, and granted patents 
resulting in licensing of the technology and licensing income. When tackling complex 
problems, universities must adapt more quickly and more fundamentally than they have 
traditionally. Increased patent activity allows the disclosure of advanced technology and 
can be accessed by all universities to improve upon ideas and meet challenges in a timely 
manner. 
Entrepreneurial thinking 
 Holden and Thorp (2013) propose that traditional sources of funds are decreasing, 
and funders of all forms have performance-based expectations that are best addressed by 
an entrepreneurial approach. With these tighter budgets, administrators are promising 
more “bang for your buck” to funding sources (Siegel et al., 2004). The best way to solve 
these complex problems is to combine traditional rationality with creative solutions. As 
stated earlier, decreased public funding forces institutions to rely more on alternative 
funding. Those alternative funding sources want to tackle big problems, and they expect 
big results (Thorp & Goldstein, 2013). 
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 Entrepreneurial thinking does not 
happen overnight, and a university cannot 
simply decide to become more 
entrepreneurial. The stakeholders 
involved must reflect entrepreneurial 
behavior throughout the technology 
transfer process to create an environment 
of entrepreneurship. Those stakeholders 
include faculty scientists, TTO staff, 
university administration, and the firm or 
entrepreneur that uses the intellectual 
property to produce a marketable product. 
The stakeholders’ involvement in each 
step of the technology transfer process is 
outlined in Figure 1.1. 
 As the technology moves through 
the steps of the technology transfer 
process, more stakeholders become 
involved. Each stakeholder has different 
motives. The university scientist prefers 
recognition within their discipline, or to 
secure additional funding for further research. The TTO prefers to protect and market the 
university’s technology, and the firm or entrepreneur that receives the technology seeks 
University 
Scientist, 
TTO, and Firm/ 
Entrepreneur 
License to 
Firm for cash, 
equity, or 
sponsored 
research 
(TTO output) 
University 
Scientist, 
TTO, and Firm/ 
Entrepreneur 
Negotiation 
Of 
License 
(TTO output) 
University 
Scientist, 
TTO, and Firm/ 
Entrepreneur 
Marketing of 
Technology to 
Firms 
(TTO output) 
University 
Scientist 
and TTO 
Patent 
University 
Scientist 
and TTO 
Evaluation of 
Technology for 
Patenting 
University 
Scientist 
and TTO 
Technology 
Disclosure 
(TTO input) 
University 
Scientist 
Scientific 
Discovery 
Figure 1.1 Technology transfer stakeholders 
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financial gain. The TTO is tasked with satisfying the needs of both the university scientist 
and the firm while also producing desirable results for the university administration. The 
TTOs play a key role in economic development through using different technology 
transfer strategies to form new ventures while simultaneously attempting to recover R&D 
and TTO administration costs (Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, & Balkin, 2005). 
University technology transfer 
 Universities use funds from various sources to conduct research. It is becoming 
increasingly competitive to obtain federal research grants as well as alternative funding. 
These funding sources want to see results. However, it is difficult to illustrate the 
intangible outcomes of research as well as the social welfare that goes along with 
university research. 
 Tangible indicators of university research output include faculty research disclosures, 
patent applications, granted patents, licenses executed, start-ups, and licensing income. 
Past the disclosure state of a research discovery, many more parties are involved than just 
the scientist. Once disclosed, the TTO must determine if the discovery warrants a patent 
application. If the application is successful and a patent is granted, the TTO must 
collaborate with potential investors and the scientist to enter into a licensing agreement if 
viable (Siegel et al., 2004).  
A summary of eight empirical studies on university technology transfer is 
included in Table 1.1. The studies all use data from the years 1990-2000. Data sources 
include the AUTM, National Science Foundation (NSF), United States Patent & 
Trademark Office, and surveys of university scientists, TTO administrators, and 
entrepreneurs. The studies included in the table evaluate the number of licenses executed, 
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patent applications, invention or technology disclosures, licenses yielding income, and 
start-ups. The studies also evaluate the dollar amount of sponsored research, royalties, 
licensing income, and additionally evaluate TTO structure and licensing strategy. Five of 
the studies find a positive relationship between the TTO staff size and TTO outputs. 
Additional variables that are found to be positively related to TTO outputs include faculty 
quality, private university classification, the age of the TTO, federal research funding, 
technology disclosures, and a for-profit TTO structure. The presence of a medical school 
in the university system and the concentration of industrial activity or R&D are found to 
be positively related to TTO outputs in some studies, but negatively in others. Variables 
that are found to have a negative relationship with TTO outputs include seeking 
sponsored research and licensing for cash rather than royalties or equity. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of empirical research on university technology transfer, 2000-present 
Study 
Statistical 
technique 
Sample 
size 
Year(s) 
analyzed 
Primary 
data 
source(s) 
Measurement 
of 
effectiveness 
(dependent 
variables) Key results 
Foltz, 
Barham, and 
Kim (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rogers, Yin, 
and 
Hoffmann 
(2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thursby, 
Jensen, and 
Thursby 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carlsson and 
Fridh (2002) 
Linear 
regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation of 
characteristics 
& technology 
transfer score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear 
regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear 
regression 
142 univ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 univ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 univ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 univ. 
1991-
1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1994-
1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1991-
1995 and 
1996 
U.S. 
Patents, 
NSF, and 
AUTM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTM and 
NSF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTM and 
survey of 
TTOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTM and 
survey of 
TTOs 
Summation of 
patent 
applications 
from 1991-
1998 in 
biotechnology
; Total 
university 
patents 
 
Scale based 
on: 
technology 
disclosures; 
patent 
applications; 
licenses 
yielding 
income; start-
ups; license 
income 
 
Licenses 
executed; 
amount of 
royalties 
received; 
number of 
patents; 
amount of 
sponsored 
research 
 
Technology 
transfer 
modeled as a 
sequence of 
events; focus 
on number of 
patents and 
number of 
licenses 
Significant and 
(+) faculty 
quality; # of 
staff; Federal 
research 
funding 
 
 
 
 
Significant and 
(+) faculty 
quality; # of 
staff; age of 
TTO; Federal 
research 
funding 
 
 
 
 
 
Significant and 
(+) 
technology 
disclosures; # 
of staff; 
medical 
school; not 
significant is 
faculty quality 
 
 
Research 
expenditures; 
technology 
disclosures; 
years TTO 
operating are 
important 
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Table 1.1 continued Summary of empirical research on university technology transfer, 2000-present 
Study 
Statistical 
technique 
Sample 
size 
Year(s) 
analyzed 
Primary 
data 
source(s) 
Measurement 
of 
effectiveness 
(dependent 
variables) Key results 
Thursby and 
Kemp (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Siegel, 
Waldman, 
and Link 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Link and 
Siegel (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Markman et 
al. (2005) 
DEA and Logit 
regression on 
efficiency 
score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stochastic 
frontier 
estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stochastic 
frontier 
estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations of 
characteristics 
112 univ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 univ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 univ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 univ. 
1991-
1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1991-
1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 & 
2000 
AUTM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTM, 
personal 
interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TTO 
director 
surveys 
Licenses 
executed; 
industry 
sponsored 
research; 
patent 
applications; 
technology 
disclosures; 
royalties 
received 
 
# of license 
agreements & 
licensing 
income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
licenses; 
annual 
licensing 
revenues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TTO structure; 
licensing 
strategy; 
incubator 
existence, or 
start-up 
ventures 
Faculty quality 
important in 
engineering; # 
of staff sig 
(+); private 
more efficient 
than public; 
medical 
school less 
efficient 
 
 
Universities in 
states with 
higher levels 
of industrial 
R&D are less 
inefficient; 
older TTOs 
tend to be 
closer to the 
frontier 
revenue 
 
For licenses: 
Number of 
disclosures 
(+); Number 
of TTO staff 
(+);  
For license 
revenue: 
Number of 
disclosures 
(+); 
 Industrial 
activity and 
Royalty (-) in 
both 
 
For profit TTO 
structure (+); 
Licensing in 
exchange for 
sponsored 
research (-); 
licensing for 
cash (-) 
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Research objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to explain this increase in UTT metrics and 
variation in technology transfer outputs across universities. Initially, this study will 
estimate the major TTO input, technology disclosures. Variables included in the TTO 
input model are TTO staff size, faculty quality, the number of Ph.D.-granting science 
departments, licensing income distribution, and research expenditures. Technology 
transfer outputs include: licenses, licensing revenue, number of licenses generating 
income, licenses executed with equity, cumulative active licenses, and the number of 
start-ups. Variables used to explain variation in technology transfer office outputs 
include: TTO characteristics, university characteristics, licensing income distribution, and 
invention disclosures. Technology transfer office outcomes are reported by the AUTM. 
The specific objectives of this research are to: 
1. Determine characteristics and policies of research universities that affect the 
number of technology disclosures to the TTO. 
2. Identify university policies and incentives that affect the technology transfer 
output. 
3. Determine if regional and local characteristics affect the technology transfer 
output of a research university. 
Previous studies evaluate time periods in the late 1990s or very early 2000s. 
However, as can be seen in the following graphics, every metric evaluated has increased 
substantially since that time. Every metric measuring TTO inputs and outputs has 
increased in the past ten years. Additionally, many more universities have reported UTT 
data to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM). Regarding TTO 
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inputs, technology disclosures, TTO full-time equivalents (a measure of TTO 
employment), and total research expenditures have all increased, especially since 2000. 
All data related to UTT is taken from the AUTM Statistics Access for Tech Transfer 
(STATT) database. Data supplied by the STATT is nominal and not corrected for 
inflation. This thesis will focus on land-grant universities, comparable non-land grant 
state supported universities and top universities noted for their research and technology 
transfer. Complete data on 86 universities listed in Appendix I are available. 
Data trends 
The percentage increase in technology transfer inputs and outputs over the last 20, 
10, and 5 year periods demonstrate a steep upward trend for the 86 universities evaluated 
in this study. A full listing of the universities included in this study can be found in 
Appendix I. Figure 1.2 illustrates the change in the average number of technology 
disclosures, average TTO staff size, and average research expenditures for universities in 
this study. The average number of technology disclosures at the universities included in 
this study increased from 80.97 in 1993 to 202.55 in 2012, or 150.15 percent. Technology 
disclosures have increased by 60.02 percent since 2003, and 25.15 percent during the 
time period of the data used in the study, from 2008 to 2012. The average TTO FTEs 
have increased by 272.07 percent since 1993, from an average of 5.00 per university to 
18.59. FTEs serve as a proxy for staff size of the TTO. A FTE equal to 1 indicates 1 full-
time worker. FTEs are averaged over the period of 2008-2012. TTO FTEs increased just 
over 50 percent from 2003-2012, and 11.65 percent during the time period evaluated in 
the study. The average total research expenditures increased 197.96 percent from 1993-
2012, from an average of $184,093,306 in 1993 to $548,530,248 in 2012. The average 
13 
 
dollar amount of total research expenditures increased 64.70 percent since 2003 and 
30.73 percent since 2008. 
 
 Given the sharp increase in technology disclosures, changes in TTO outputs are 
also examined. TTO outputs examined in this study include the average number of 
licenses executed, average licensing revenue, average licenses generating income, and the 
average number of cumulative active licenses. The trends for the past ten years for these 
TTO outputs are illustrated in Figures 1.3-1.6. 
The average number of licenses executed by universities is the number of licenses 
executed by universities in this study during an academic year. Licenses executed is not 
represented until 2005 in the AUTM STATT database, so only the period from 2005-
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Figure 1.2 Average technology disclsoures, TTO FTEs, and Total 
Research Expenditures, N=86 
Technology disclosures (x10) TTO FTEs Total research expenditures (x$10,000,000)
Source: AUTM 2013 
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2012 is evaluated. The average number of licenses executed increased 26.93 percent from 
2005-2012 from an average of 34.88 in 2005 to 44.27 in 2012. The increase in the 
average number of licenses executed is illustrated in Figure 1.3. 
 
 The average dollar amount of licensing revenue, illustrated in Figure 1.4, 
increased 121.13 percent from 2003-2012 when averaged for all universities in this study, 
from $8,922,740.72 to $19,731,193.91. Licensing revenue reached a high of 
$25,336,981.66 in 2008, resulting in a decrease of average licensing revenue of 22.12 
percent for the time period evaluated in this study of 2008-2012.  
 The average number of licenses generating income includes the number of 
licenses at a university that generate income during the academic year. Examining all 
universities in this study, the number of licenses generating income increased by 78.52 
percent from 2003-2012. Universities owned the rights to an average of 88.54 licenses 
25.00
27.00
29.00
31.00
33.00
35.00
37.00
39.00
41.00
43.00
45.00
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 1.3 Average number of licenses executed, N=86 Source: AUTM 2013 
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generating income in 2003 compared to an average of 158.07 in 2012. This increase in 
licenses generating income can be seen in Figure 1.5. 
 
 
$50.00
$70.00
$90.00
$110.00
$130.00
$150.00
$170.00
$190.00
$210.00
$230.00
$250.00
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
x 
$
1
0
0
,0
0
0
.0
0
 
Figure 1.4 Average licensing revenue, N=86 Source: AUTM 2013 
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
180.00
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 1.5 Average number of licenses generating income, N=86 
Source: AUTM 2013 
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 The average number of cumulative active licenses, illustrated in Figure 1.6, 
increased from 227.25 in 2003 to 337.31 in 2012 for the universities in this study for an 
increase of 48.43 percent. Cumulative active licenses indicate the total of all licenses still 
active, regardless of the year they were executed, for each university. 
 
With the exception of licensing revenue, every measure of TTO output increased 
over the last ten years of available data. This increase in licensing activity and technology 
effort is evaluated in this study using policy and characteristic information from the 
sources outlined in subsequent chapters. The remaining chapters are organized as 
follows: Chapter 2 will include the theoretical framework and hypotheses. Chapter 3 will 
outline the methods for assessing research productivity at universities. Chapter 4 is a 
description of the data sources, and Chapter 5 describes the estimation procedures and 
empirical results of the study. Chapter 6 will include conclusions and suggestions for 
additional research. 
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 1.6  Average number of cumulative active licenses, N=86 
Source: AUTM 2013 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Universities desiring to become more entrepreneurial have many different models to 
review, but no single model is appropriate for all universities. Research universities are 
much different than private for-profit firms because research universities are not 
necessarily evaluated on profitability, but on output of degrees, research, and extension 
efforts. No two universities are the same. What works for a private, liberal arts university 
may not work for a public, land-grant university because of their different missions. 
 Technologies that warrant a patent or license normally require a certain degree of 
applied research for development for commercialization. Many university scientists 
conduct basic research and might be reluctant to devote their time to more applied 
research that is necessary to either create patentable and licensable technology or apply 
their basic research to a marketable model (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Jensen, 
Thursby, & Thursby, 2003; Thorp & Goldstein, 2013). The best solution these 
universities have to commercialize their technology may lie within their respective TTOs 
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(Shane, 2004). University TTOs generally act as liaisons between faculty scientists and 
private firms when searching for licensing avenues. More often than not, the goals of the 
TTO are aligned more closely with those of the university administration than with the 
university scientists (Jensen et al., 2003; Thursby et al., 2001). Royalty sharing with the 
faculty filing disclosures may be viewed as an attempt to align the goals of faculty with 
those of the university. 
TTOs must not only find a common ground among several parties with diverse 
needs, but also exhibit success in obtaining income sources to fund technology patenting 
expenses. One effect of this need for results is that many TTOs only apply for a patent 
once a licensing agreement has been signed (Thursby & Thursby, 2002). There can also 
be a restricted pool of technologies to license as less than half of all technology 
breakthroughs are disclosed to the TTO (Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, & Balkin, 2004; 
Thursby & Thursby, 2002). Reasons for non-disclosure include: 1) faculty are unwilling 
to delay publication, 2) faculty scientists see payback from publication of basic research, 
3) faculty do not want to devote time to the applied research necessary to bring the 
technology to market, and/or 4) other “philosophical reasons” related to their notions of 
the proper role of academic scientists and engineers (Jensen et al., 2003; Thursby & 
Thursby, 2002). Table 2.1 outlines those differences in motives and cultures among the 
three parties involved (Siegel et al., 2003). 
The age of the TTO varies from university to university. Some date back to 1925 
while some may be less than ten years old. More experienced TTOs have likely 
commercialized more disclosures and facilitated numerous patents and license 
agreements. The length of time a TTO has existed can measure any learning or 
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experience affects within the TTO (Friedman & Silberman, 2003). Established networks 
and relationships developed over time are important in the success of the TTO. These 
networks and relationships come with experience. Experience and time are not 
synonymous in this instance. However, given the difficulty of obtaining the experience of 
each employee of each TTO, the total time the TTO has been in existence is used as a 
proxy for “experience.” The networks, experience, and specialized knowledge that are 
accumulated over time will help the TTO be more successful. This success can be 
measured in both inputs and outputs for the TTO. TTO offices must simultaneously seek 
technology disclosures that have the possibility to result in a patent and/or licensing 
income to the university, and once the disclosure is received take the necessary steps to 
either patent the technology, license it, or both. 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of university technology transfer stakeholders 
Stakeholder Actions Motives Organizational 
Culture 
University scientist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology transfer 
office 
 
 
 
 
Firm/Entrepreneur 
Discovery of new 
knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Work with faculty 
and firms or 
entrepreneurs to 
facilitate 
licensing deals 
 
Commercialize 
new technology 
Recognition within 
the scientific 
community 
Financial gain and 
desire to secure 
additional 
research funding 
 
Protect the market 
and university’s 
intellectual 
property 
 
 
Financial gain 
Scientific 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic 
 
 
 
 
 
Entrepreneurial 
Source: (Siegel et al., 2003) 
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University scientists are frequently required, according to each school’s 
intellectual property policy, to disclose new technologies once they are discovered. 
Previous authors suggest that the disclosure policy may not be effective. More than one 
study has pointed out that less than half of all discoveries are disclosed for a number of 
reasons (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Jensen et al., 2003; Siegel et al., 2003; Thorp & 
Goldstein, 2013), but disclosures are still a tangible measure of innovation output of 
university scientists. In order to see more disclosures a university scientist must see a 
benefit to disclosure rather than more rapid publication. If the benefit of a possible 
licensing agreement is not greater than the benefit of seeking more immediate 
publication, faculty may not disclose the technology and instead seek alternative methods 
of disclosure through peer-reviewed publications. 
The hypotheses stated from this point forward are stated in the alternative form. 
Hypotheses one through five pertain to the technology disclosures model while the 
remaining hypotheses are for the TTO outputs models. Table 2.2, summarizing 
hypotheses for technology disclosures follows hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 1. The number of technology disclosures is positively related to the 
total number of full-time equivalent people in the TTO.  
 The number of years the TTO has existed will have little effect on the technology 
transfer output without proper management and leadership. The differing goals of 
university scientists and administration must be handled with care by the TTO to 
maximize the disclosures received from the university scientists and turn those 
disclosures into a financial return for the university and the faculty member. Without a 
clear mission and purpose, the TTO can get caught up in the many objectives of a 
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research university (undergraduate and graduate education, basic research, applied 
research, funded research, and economic development). 
 Hypothesis 2. The number of technology disclosures is positively related to the 
faculty quality in Ph.D. granting science departments. 
 Thursby and Kemp (2002), Rogers et al. (2000), Foltz et al. (2000), and Thursby 
et al. (2001) all found that university technology transfer is positively related to faculty 
quality. This suggests that higher faculty quality tend to produce inventions with greater 
commercial viability (Friedman & Silberman, 2003). 
 Hypothesis 3. The number of technology disclosures is positively related to 
research expenditures.  
 Research expenditures can be interpreted as a proxy for research capital such as 
labs, number of faculty, research support, and additional items used in university 
research. Rogers et al. (2000), Foltz et al. (2000), and Friedman and Silberman (2003) all 
found that technology transfer is positively related to research funding. 
Hypothesis 4. The number of technology disclosures is positively related to 
individual faculty inventor incentives. 
Hypothesis 5. The number of technology disclosures is positively related to 
departmental faculty inventor incentives. 
Faculty incentives can be classified as incentives directly to faculty in the form of 
licensing income share, or as a share of licensing income distributed to the inventor’s 
research, lab, department, or college.  Link and Siegel (2005), Friedman and Silberman 
(2003), and Lach and Schankerman (2008) contend that licensing income is positively 
related to higher royalty shares for faculty members. In order to receive any form of 
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licensing income, faculty must first choose to disclose the invention to the university 
TTO. 
Table 2.2 Null and alternative hypotheses for technology disclosures 
Variable Null Hypothesis Alternative Hypothesis 
TTO FTEs – H11 
Faculty quality – H21 
Research expenditures – H31 
Faculty rewards (individual) – H41 
Faculty rewards (department) – H51 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
1.   denotes the amount of technology disclosures. 
 
 Hypotheses six through eleven pertain to TTO outputs and are stated in their 
alternative form. Table 2.3, summarizing the TTO output hypotheses follows hypothesis 
12. 
Hypothesis 6. TTO output is positively related to the number of years since the 
TTO was established. 
TTOs that have been in existence for a longer period of time have the opportunity 
to evaluate more disclosures and execute more licenses. Given the difficulty of obtaining 
the experience of each individual TTO faculty and staff member, the number of years the 
TTO has been in existence is used as a proxy for overall TTO experience. Multiple 
previous studies have found that TTO output is positively related to the age of the TTO 
(Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Lowe & Gonzalez-Brambila, 2007; Rogers et al., 2000; 
Siegel et al., 2003). 
 Hypothesis 7. TTO output is positively related to a clear mission and objectives 
for the TTO. 
  Friedman and Silberman (2003) found strong evidence that university TTOs with 
a clear mission statement that focuses on gaining a financial return to the university and 
23 
 
the university scientists is positively related to TTO output. Additionally, Markman et al. 
(2005) found that TTO output is positively related to a TTO with a “for profit” structure. 
Hypothesis 8. TTO output is positively related to individual faculty inventor 
incentives. 
Hypothesis 9 TTO output is positively related to departmental faculty inventor 
incentives. 
As mentioned above, previous studies (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Lach & 
Schankerman, 2008; Link & Siegel, 2005), contend that licensing income is positively 
related to higher royalty shares for faculty members. 
Hypothesis 10. TTO output is positively related to the location of the university 
with respect to the concentration of technology firms, industrial research, and an overall 
entrepreneurial climate. 
Friedman and Silberman (2003) examined the contribution of research 
universities to the surrounding regional economy.  Siegel et al. (2004) additionally found 
that universities in states with higher levels of industrial R&D are more successful with  
technology transfer. The ability of the university to generate licenses and licensing 
income may be dependent on spillovers from surrounding industry activity. Spillovers 
include the infrastructure of lawyers, venture capitalists, consultants, entrepreneurs, and 
industry-based researchers (Friedman & Silberman, 2003). 
Hypothesis 11. TTO output is positively related to university classification as a 
land-grant university. 
Land-grant universities have always supported applied research and adoption of 
practices based on research since their inception. The purpose for establishing the land-
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grant university system was to apply basic research to real-world problems and 
disseminate the application to the surrounding areas. Applied research should be a natural 
component of land-grant institutions. 
Hypothesis 12. TTO output is positively related to technology disclosures from 
university scientists. 
Technology disclosures, while not always disclosed (Friedman & Silberman, 
2003), are still a major input for TTOs. Thursby et al. (2001) and Carlsson and Fridh 
(2002) agree that disclosures have a significant and positive relationship with TTO 
outputs. 
Table 2.3 Null and alternative hypotheses for TTO outputs 
Variable Null Hypothesis Alternative Hypothesis 
TTO Age – H61 
Clear TTO mission – H71 
Faculty rewards (individual) – H81 
Faculty rewards (department) – H91 
High tech locations – H101 
Land-grant university – H111 
Technology disclosures – H121 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
1.   denotes the amount of licenses or licensing income. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Technology transfer process 
 
To test the hypotheses, a two-equation recursive system is proposed. Supported 
by Friedman and Silberman (2003) and Carlsson and Fridh (2002), the two-equation 
recursive system represents the models of technology transfer as a sequence of events; 
technology disclosures being the first event, and TTO outputs the second. 
Technology disclosures 
The first equation will analyze the factors that affect the number of technology 
disclosures (TD). Technology disclosure is a university scientist or faculty decision based 
on the perceived costs and benefits of disclosure versus early publication of results. Prior 
publication or presentation of research is, in the patent world, a form of prior public 
disclosure and limits the time period in which a patent can be filed. Prior public 
disclosure may also limit the value of the technology to an individual firm who may be 
willing to license technology (whether patented or not) if they can have exclusive rights 
to the technology.  
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If a faculty member files the disclosure, it will take time to either acquire a patent 
and/or license the technology. Intellectual property policy or a licensing agreement may 
further restrict the ability of the scientist to publish the discovery in scientific journals. 
The conflict between peer recognition through publication and the possible benefits of 
commercialization are among the costs and benefits of the faculty decision to disclose or 
publish. The probability of a return from disclosure and publication are uncertain at the 
time the decision about the disposition of technology is being made.  
The technology transfer office can only work with the inputs they receive from 
the university faculty (Jensen et al., 2003). Thus, while the technology disclosures (TD) 
are the output of the first equation, it is the raw material, or input used by the TTO to 
create their various measures of output.  TTO officials have the responsibility of licensing 
and/or patenting the disclosed discovery if it is determined there is potential. Once the 
new technology exists, in most cases, the university owns the intellectual property rights 
and might be able to license the technology to another entity. It must be noted that 
university technologies may be licensed without a patent. Once the license is executed, it 
is up to the entity that received the license to determine if the innovation is commercially 
viable. Generally, when the entity commercializes the technology, creating an income 
stream, the university begins to earn licensing income from the technology (Friedman & 
Silberman, 2003).  
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Figure 3.1 outlines the technology transfer process, and reflects the model used in 
this study. University TTOs must seek technology disclosures from university scientists. 
Once the disclosures are received, the TTOs must seek intellectual property protection 
(patents), transfer the technology to a firm willing to market the technology (license), or 
both. TTO output can be measured in many ways including licenses executed, licensing 
income, start-ups, licenses with equity, or options. University policies may influence 
disclosures, as well as influence the type of output the TTO pursues. Some universities 
will also take equity positions rather than licensing income from an executed technology 
agreement. This choice is made by the TTO and is often a choice of whether to carry out 
the preferences of the university scientist or the university administration. Jensen et al. 
(2003) find that nearly 30 percent more TTOs and administrators put emphasis on 
royalties while, again, roughly 30 percent more inventors prefer sponsored research, such 
as research sponsored or funded by industry, as a result of an innovation. Still, more often 
University 
characteristics TTO 
output: 
Licenses    
  Executed 
License  
  income  
  received 
Licenses  
  
generatin
g   
  income 
Cumulativ
e  
University 
policies 
Technology 
disclosures 
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Ph.D. 
departments 
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Research 
expenditures 
TTO 
University 
location 
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Figure 3.1 Technology transfer model 
University 
policies 
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than not, the TTO will execute a licensing agreement if there is a strong possibility of 
seeing a return of licensing income. With so much that can happen from the time an 
innovation is disclosed until a licensing agreement is reached, we use TDs, not patents or 
licenses, as the key input to the TTO. This is supported by Siegel, Waldman et al. (2003) 
and Friedman and Silberman (2003).Technology disclosures will first be estimated using 
Equation 3.1. 
Equation 3.1 Technology disclosures equation 
                        
                                                  
                                          
 where: 
TD = number of disclosures; 
Faculty Quality = overall faculty quality in Ph.D. science departments rankings 
from the National Research Council; 
Number of Science Ph.D. Departments = number of Ph.D. granting science 
departments from the evaluated universities; 
TTO FTEs= total number of persons employed by each TTO; 
IP Policy = net licensing income distribution to university scientists and their 
respective departments; and 
Research Expenditures = total research dollars expended by the university.  
TTO output 
 TTO output will be measured by the number of licenses, number of licenses 
generating income, start-ups, licensing income, and licenses with equity, and cumulative 
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active licenses; all of which are potential outcomes from a technology disclosure. 
Licenses with equity and start-ups are additional measures of TTO output, but in this 
sample is relatively low for many universities. Because of the low total, licenses with 
equity and start-ups are not evaluated. However, the licenses executed measure captures 
both licenses executed with equity and start-ups.TDs serve as one of the inputs to the 
second equations. Using this approach isolates the intellectual property policy variables 
influencing technology transfer and the success of the TTO from variables that influence 
the stock of technologies available for commercialization. The second equation, Equation 
3.2, analyzes the output of the TTO. 
Equation 3.2 TTO output equation 
                                          +           
                                       
 where 
TTO output = TTO output measure, which could be 
 licenses executed, 
 licensing income, 
 licenses generating income, or  
 cumulative active licenses; 
TD = number of technology disclosures; 
Tech = high-tech environmental factors that would be conducive to greater 
technology transfer output; 
IP Policy = net licensing income distribution to university scientists and their 
respective departments; 
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TTO age = number of years the TTO has been in existence; 
TTO organization = organizational characteristics of the university TTO; and 
Organization = organizational characteristics of the university. 
IP Policy is included in both equations because the benefits to faculty and their 
departments have a relationship both to the university scientist’s propensity to disclose 
the technology and to work further on the technology to produce a marketable product.  
 The models will be examined for contemporaneous correlation to ensure the error 
terms from Equation 3.1 and 3.2 are independent. 
 
31 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DATA 
 
Data introduction 
 
 Data for this study is from the AUTM STATT database, the National Research 
Council’s assessment over United States Doctorate programs, “A Data-Based Assessment 
of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States”(Ostriker, Kuh, & Voytuk, 2011), 
the Milken Institute’s report on geography of knowledge-based industries, “North 
America’s High-Tech Economy: The Geography of Knowledge-Based Industries” (R. C. 
DeVol, Klowden, Bedroussian, & Yeo, 2009), and individual university intellectual 
property policy statements.  
The unit of analysis for this study is a U.S. research university. Universities to be 
included in the study begin with land-grant universities created as a result of the Morrill 
Act of 1862. Additionally, four-year, state-funded research universities that correspond 
with the land-grant universities are included, although not all states possess such 
institutions. Examples of such corresponding institutions are the University of Oklahoma 
and Oklahoma State University or the University of South Carolina and Clemson  
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University. In order to examine the characteristics and policies of the most successful 
universities in regard to licensing income, the top 25 licensing income earning 
universities are included (AUTM, 2013), as well as any Ivy League schools that are not 
already included. Association of American Universities ("Member Institutions and Years 
of Admission," 2014) member institutions were included as they are an organization of 
universities focused on research funding and research policy issues ("Member Institutions 
and Years of Admission," 2014). Once the universities are selected, only universities that 
provided data for the period of 2008-2012 are included. Physical locations are indicated 
in Figure 4.1, and a full list of universities included can be found in Appendix I. 
 
AUTM data 
 The data source for disclosures (TD) and technology outputs (TTO 
outputs) is AUTM’s STATT database, which is a searchable, exportable database of over 
Figure 4.1 University locations 
Non land-grant 
Land-grant 
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20 years of academic licensing data collected from participating academic institutions 
(AUTM, 2013). Member institutions supply this data, but not all institutions supplied 
data for all years. Data from 2008-2012 is used in this study. The AUTM data is self-
reported and not audited. This data is much better known than when the survey began in 
1991, and there is much publicity surrounding the results. Thus, the incentive to provide 
accurate information is much greater for the years included in this study than the earlier 
reporting periods that past studies evaluated (Friedman & Silberman, 2003; Siegel et al., 
2003; Thursby et al., 2001; Thursby & Kemp, 2002). 
The TTO Age data is from the AUTM STATT database and is the number of 
years the university TTO has been in existence. TTO Age is calculated by subtracting the 
year the TTO was established for each university from 2012, which is the last year of 
data used from the STATT database. 
The Research expenditures data is the five-year average for the total research 
expenditures by each university over the period of 2008-2012 and is taken from the 
AUTM STATT database. Research expenditures represent the total research 
expenditures, including federally supported research expenditures and industry supported 
research expenditures. The dollar amount is expressed in millions of dollars. 
The TTO FTEs data is readily available on the AUTM STATT database. TTO 
FTEs are averaged over the period of 2008-2012. 
 The Organization data includes university characteristics, and includes the 
presence of a medical school in the university system, and classification as a public or 
private university as well as classification as a land-grant university. Presence of a 
medical school in the university system is indicated in the AUTM STATT database 
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(AUTM, 2013). The classification as a public or private university is available in the 
National Research Council database(Ostriker et al., 2011). Land-grant classification is 
taken from university websites. 
National Research Council data 
The Faculty Quality and Number of Science Ph.D. Departments data is from “A 
Data-Based Assessment of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States,” 
Committee on an Assessment of Research Doctorate Programs, National Research 
Council, 2011. The study offers ranges of rankings for overall program quality that derive 
from two methods: survey-based (S Rankings) and regression-based (R Rankings). The 
process of ranking the universities is outlined below: 
S Rankings (for survey-based rankings) are based on how faculty weighted—
or assigned importance to—20 characteristics that the study committee 
determined to be factors contributing to program quality. The weights of 
characteristics vary by field based on faculty survey responses in each of those 
fields. Programs in a field rank higher if they demonstrate strength in the 
characteristics carrying greater weights. 
R Rankings (for regression-based rankings) depend on the weights calculated 
from faculty ratings of a sample of programs in their field. These ratings were 
related, through a multiple regression and principal components analysis, to 
the 20 characteristics that the committee had determined to be factors of 
program quality. The resulting weights were then applied to data 
corresponding to those characteristics for each of the programs in the field. 
Programs are also ranked on three “dimensional measures” of program 
quality—on faculty research activity, on student support and outcomes, and on 
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faculty and student diversity. These rankings are based on specific subsets of 
characteristics relating to each of the dimensional measures, with the weights 
of the characteristics normalized (i.e., re-calculated to add to one). 
For every program variable, two random values are generated—one for the 
data value and one for the weight. The product of these summed across the 20 
variables is then used to calculate a rating, which is compared with other 
program ratings to get a ranking. The uncertainty in program rankings is 
quantified, in part, by calculating the S Ranking and R Ranking, respectively, of 
a given program 500 times, each time with a different and randomly selected 
half-sample of respondents. The resulting 500 rankings are numerically 
ordered and the lowest and highest five percent are excluded. The 5th and 
95th percentile rankings in the ordered list of 500 define the range of rankings 
shown in the table (Ostriker et al., 2011). 
 For the Faculty Quality rankings in the study, S-rankings are used. S-rankings are 
used in the study because an important difference between the R and S rankings is the 
weight of the average number of Ph.D.s granted over the previous 5 years is often the 
largest weight in the R rankings and relatively small in the S rankings. The ranking that is 
least related to Number of Ph.D. Departments, S-rankings, is used in this study. The 5
th
 
Percentile and 95
th
 Percentile rankings are averaged and then ranked among the 
universities included in the study from 1-86 with the highest quality university receiving 
a ranking of 86 and the lowest quality university receiving a ranking of 1.  
 The Number of science Ph.D. Departments is also from the National Research 
Council report. The data were collected for the academic year 2005-2006 from more than 
5,000 doctoral programs at 212 universities. The observations span 62 fields, and the 
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research productivity data are based typically on a five-year interval. More specifically, 
for this study it is the number of science Ph.D. departments. Science Ph.D. departments 
include fields included in the “broad field” categories of “Agricultural sciences,” 
“Biological and health sciences,” “Engineering,” and “Physical and mathematical 
sciences.” A breakdown of the individual field categories within the “broad field” 
categories can be found in Appendix II. The National Research Council warns that 
comparisons between the 1993 rankings, which were used in the Friedman and Silberman 
(2003) study, and the rankings from the current study may be misleading. 
Milken Institute data 
The Tech rankings are from “North America’s High-Tech Economy: The 
Geography of Knowledge-Based Industries,” published by the Milken Institute (R. C. 
DeVol et al., 2009). This is an updated ranking of the source used in the Friedman and 
Silberman (2003) study. The number used in this study is the “Tech Pole Scores.” R. C. 
DeVol et al. (2009) rely on two primary concepts to develop the tech pole scores. The 
first involves the concentration of high-technology industry in the metropolitan area in 
relation to the North American average. The location quotients (LQ) calculated for this 
measure first determine the share of employment wages in the metropolitan area, then 
divide by the same ratio for North America for each high-technology industry. A LQ of 
1.0 in a metropolitan area for a particular industry indicates that it matches the average 
concentration whereas a LQ of 1.5 indicated 50 percent that the high-technology industry 
is 50 percent more concentrated in the metropolitan area. However, the LQ alone is an 
insufficient measure to determine the relative importance of a metropolitan area in a 
particular high-technology category. Smaller metropolitan areas may have a very high 
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concentration in a given industry, but not much of a role to play in the larger North 
American context. The LQ is adjusted by calculating what share each metropolitan area 
represents of the North American total by high-technology category. The LQ is 
multiplied by the share of the North American total for both employment and wages. 
Finally, each metropolitan area is rebased to the top-scoring metropolitan area, which 
receives a score of 100. This Tech Pole Score gives a powerful spatial measurement of 
high-tech industries across North America (R. C. DeVol et al., 2009). Similar to the 1999 
rankings, Silicon Valley, CA sits atop the list and has a core more than twice second-
ranked Seattle. 
Universities were placed in a metropolitan area based on their location and 
assigned the corresponding Tech Pole Scores. Past studies (Friedman & Silberman, 2003) 
used a composite index of the lower metropolitan areas to compute an index for 
universities not located in a metropolitan area. However, in this study universities not 
located in a metropolitan area in the Milken study are assigned a tech pole score from the 
closest metropolitan area that is rated. Oklahoma State University is in Stillwater, OK, 
which is 62.8 miles from Tulsa, OK and 66.9 miles from Oklahoma City, OK, thus the 
Tulsa, OK score is assigned to Oklahoma State University. The University of Oklahoma 
is in Norman, OK, which is 20.2 miles from Oklahoma City, OK, thus is assigned the 
Oklahoma City, OK score. The full list of universities and their tech pole scores can be 
found in Appendix III. The top and bottom ten metropolitan areas as well as the 
metropolitan areas assigned to Oklahoma State University and the University of 
Oklahoma are listed in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 Milken Institute Tech Pole Scores 
Metropolitan Area Tech Pole Score 
San Jose, CA 
Seattle, WA 
Cambridge, MA 
Washington, DC 
Los Angeles, CA 
Dallas, TX 
San Diego, CA 
Santa Ana, CA 
New York, NY 
San Francisco, CA 
Tulsa, OK (Oklahoma State University 
Oklahoma City, OK (University of 
Oklahoma) 
New Orleans, LA (5)* 
Knoxville, TN (4)*  
Baton Rouge, LA (9)* 
Corvallis, OR (10)* 
Columbia, SC (7)* 
Fayetteville, AR (12)* 
State College, PA (31)* 
Champaign-Urbana, IL (51)* 
Tuscaloosa, AL (96)* 
Lawrence, KS (65)* 
100.00 
46.40 
45.20 
41.80 
40.20 
21.80 
19.30 
17.70 
16.80 
16.10 
1.30 
1.20 
0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
0.20 
0.10 
0.00 
*The number in parentheses following the metropolitan area name is the number of 
metropolitan areas with identical scores. The metropolitan area name is an actual 
metropolitan area associated with a university in this study. 
 
Other data sources 
 IP Policy data is taken from each university intellectual property statement, found 
on the university TTO website. All but three universities evaluated stated that the 
university owns all ownership rights to any patentable technology that was discovered 
while working on a university project, or while using any resources provided by the 
university. Disclosure sections are largely similar in that they require university 
employees to disclose any possible patentable technology as soon as it is discovered, 
which is consistent with the requirement of federally funded research per the Bayh-Dole 
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Act of 1980. Income distribution statements vary as much as the universities themselves. 
The majority of universities recover all expenses incurred while acquiring a patent or 
licensing before distributing any income (net income) from a discovery to a department 
or person making a disclosure. Some distribute a percentage or all of the gross income 
from a development to the technology creator up to a certain dollar amount of gross 
income before recovering expenses and distributing the net income to different parties of 
interest. The policies vary in that some use a tiered distribution system, mostly decreasing 
the distribution percentage to the creator as the net income level increases, while others 
specify a straight percentage distribution to the creator. Intellectual property statements 
also specify how most funds not used to recover expenses or distribute to the creator 
should be distributed. Distributions include a wide range of percentages to the creator’s 
research or lab, creator’s department, creator’s college, creator’s campus, scholarship or 
research funds, a faculty pool of distribution, different departments within the university, 
and some additional funds back to the TTO. These percentages vary among all 
universities. In universities that specify a tiered distribution to the scientist that discloses 
the technology, most additional distribution percentages are specified on a tiered scale for 
additional distributions, i.e. to the lab, research, department, or college of the disclosing 
scientist. For the universities that the technology creator maintains intellectual property 
ownership, there is no distribution information, and it is assumed that the distribution 
percentage is 100 percent. 
 Policy statements from a land-grant, Oklahoma State University, and a non-land-
grant university, Princeton University, will be used to illustrate some differences in 
policy statements. Both universities require disclosure of any discovery by university 
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scientists, and each retains ownership of intellectual property in the event of a granted 
patent. Oklahoma State University has a uniform distribution schedule that is available on 
the university website. 
A. All direct costs incurred by the University in obtaining, maintaining, and  
protecting the patent or other protection for the property, licensing, and 
/or marketing of the property shall first be recaptured from any royalties 
received by the University. 
 
B. After recovery of the above costs, the remainder of the royalty income shall 
be distributed as follows:  
50 percent to the inventor(s), 
30 percent to the University, and 
20 percent to the college or division of the inventor(s) 
("Intellectual property," 2010). 
 The income share does not change at any level of licensing income. Princeton, 
however, uses a tiered income sharing system that lowers the share of income 
distributed to the university scientist as the licensing income increases. The 
Princeton intellectual property policy statement is available on the university 
website. 
Any income realized by the University from its equity in an invention will be 
used for the purpose of research or scholarly activity, with the preferential 
consideration being given to the field of activity in which the invention was 
made. 
1) For an invention in which the University owns all rights in accordance with 
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Section c. above, the inventor will be paid the following percentages of the net 
income realized by the University: fifty percent (50 percent) of the first 
$100,000; forty percent (40 percent) of the next $400,000; and thirty percent 
(30 percent) of the amount in excess of$500,000 ("Rules and Procedures of the 
Faculty of Princeton University and Other Provisions of Concern to the 
Faculty," 2011) 
 One difference in the two statements is the declaration of distribution to entities 
other than the inventor. While some statements outline the entire distribution schedule, 
others only specify what is distributed to the inventor of the technology, and the 
remainder of the income distribution is ambiguous. 
 All income distribution percentages are based on net licensing income rather than 
gross, as the majority of statements detail the distribution percentages based on net 
licensing income after patent expenses are recovered. To compare all university 
distributions to technology creators, the distributions are calculated as a weighted average 
at the $100,000.00 level of licensing income. When the policies specify that an additional 
percentage of the licensing income be withheld for TTO-related expenses in excess of 
what is necessary to recoup any expenses related to patenting and licensing the 
technology, the specified percentage is taken into consideration in the calculations. For 
example, if a university first recovers all expenses relating to patenting, then withholds an 
additional 15 percent of the licensing income for the TTO, the calculations for income 
distribution are calculated based on 85 percent, not 100 percent of the net income. For a 
university that simply recovers patent expenses, and then distributes 40 percent of the net 
income to the creator, the share of income to the creator is calculated as 40 percent. 
However, if a university withholds an additional 15 percent prior to distribution, the share 
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of income to the creator is calculated as 40 percent of 85 percent, or 34 percent. 
Examples of income sharing distributions for the top and bottom five universities by 
inventor share are included in Table 4.2, and a table with all universities included in the 
study broken down by income distribution tier is in Appendix IV. 
Table 4.2 Examples of net licensing income distribution to inventor 
University 
Average distribution at $100,000 income 
(percent) 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine of NYU 
University of Chicago 
University of Iowa 
University of Hawaii 
Mississippi State University 
North Carolina State University 
University of Colorado 
University of Arizona 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
University of North Carolina 
100.00  
 100.00  
 100.00  
 66.67  
 52.50 
25.00  
 25.00  
 21.25  
 20.00  
 15.00 
Source: AUTM (2013) 
 
The top five universities in regards to income sharing are Mount Sinai School of 
Medicine of NYU, University of Chicago, University of Iowa, University of Hawaii, and 
Mississippi State University. The five universities with the lowest income sharing 
average are North Carolina State University, University of Colorado, University of 
Arizona, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and University of North Carolina. 
It should be noted that Mount Sinai School of Medicine and University of 
Chicago do not claim ownership to any intellectual property created by faculty, so for the 
purposes of this study, their income distribution to inventors is 100 percent. Additionally, 
University of Wisconsin does not claim ownership of  any intellectual property created 
by faculty unless required by funding agreements. Only when ownership is required by 
funding agreements, such as for federally funded research, does the University of 
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Wisconsin distribute 20 percent of the licensing income from technology created from the 
research agreement to the technology inventor. For the purposes of this study, the 
University of Wisconsin is assigned a licensing income distribution to the inventor of 20 
percent. 
 Statements were examined to review distribution to entities related to the 
university scientist, or inventor, such as the inventor’s research or lab, department, or 
college. Since not all universities classify disciplines, colleges, and departments 
identically, all distributions were grouped. If the intellectual property statement included 
distribution to the university scientist’s laboratory, research, department, or college, the 
university received a value of 1, and zero otherwise. 
TTO organization data is from the individual university TTO websites. Similar to 
the Friedman and Silberman (2003) study, each TTO mission statement was evaluated. 
TTO mission statements were examined for words such as “licensing,” “royalty,” 
“financial return,” “income,” or similar language to indicate a profit-seeking mission. If 
the mission statement conveys a clear message of commercialization or returning funds to 
the inventor or the inventor’s department, the university received a value of 1, and 0 
otherwise. Additionally, the university TTO webpage was reviewed for any easily 
accessible reports of past technologies or activity reports. If there were easily accessible 
reports, the university value remained 1, but if there were no reports easily accessible the 
value was decreased to 0 for the TTO organization variable.  
 The mission for the University of Alabama is from the Office of Technology 
Transfer webpage. There is no clear mission, and a rather vague statement of what the 
TTO is to do. There is no mention of royalty, licensing, or any financial return to the 
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university or researchers. There is also no easily accessible report on licensing income or 
statement of activities for the TTO. 
To effectively manage and deploy the intellectual property assets of the 
University thereby generating benefits for UA, the community and the general 
public ("About OTT," 2014). 
 Contrast the University of Alabama TTO mission statement with that of Stanford 
University’s Office of Technology Licensing. There is a clear income, or profit 
motivation in the mission. Additionally, there is an easily viewable summary table of 
TTO activity and access activity reports from previous years from the TTO homepage.   
The mission of Stanford University's Office of Technology Licensing (OTL) is to 
promote the transfer of Stanford technology for society's use and benefit while 
generating unrestricted income to support research and education ("About 
OTL," 2014). 
 The University of Alabama received a value of 0 while Stanford University 
received a value of 1 for the Organization variable. Each university TTO webpage was 
included in the review with some sites containing both a clear mission and easy access to 
activity statements, some containing either a clear mission or access to statements, or 
neither. If the TTO site contained both the mission and statement requirements, the 
university received a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
 Data was examined for any oddities and reviewed against the STATT database or 
the individual university policy statement. In order to capture as much information as 
possible, it was initially decided to examine all universities for a ten-year period. 
Seventy-seven universities provided enough consecutive years of data to be included in 
the study. However, once the time period was shortened to five years, ten universities 
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were gained for a total of 87 universities, 44 of which are land-grant universities. 
However, there is not ranking information present for West Virginia University in the 
National Research Council database. Therefore, West Virginia is not included in the 
study. With the exclusion, the total number of universities is 86, with 43 possessing land-
grant status. The University of California System, including the University of California-
Berkeley, University of California-Davis, University of California-Irvine, University of 
California-Los Angeles, University of California-Merced, University of California-
Riverside, University of California-San Diego, University of California-San Francisco, 
University of California-Santa Barbara, and University of California-Santa Cruz, is 
treated as one university system since they report to the AUTM as the University of 
California System. Therefore, individual rankings for the National Research Council 
database are averaged to create a “University of California System” overall ranking. The 
complete list of universities included can be found in Appendix I. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Technology disclosures model 
 
The descriptive statistics for the technology disclosures equation are shown in Tables 5.1 
and 5.2, with regression results displayed in table 5.3. The technology disclosure model is 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), then correcting for heteroscedasticity using 
Harvey’s procedure to produce  estimated generalized least squares (GLS) results. The 
first model is estimated for technology disclosures, and then additional models are 
estimated for TTO output measures including licenses executed, licensing income, 
licenses generating income, and cumulative active licenses. 
 Only the distribution to inventor’s department variable is an indicator variable. If 
a university distributes a share of licensing income to the inventor’s department, the 
university receives a value of 1, 0 otherwise. A mean of 0.74 indicates that 74 percent of 
the universities in this study distribute a percentage of licensing income to the inventor’s 
department. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for technology disclosures model, N=86 universities 
Variable Name Mean
3 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Technology Disclosures
1 
Faculty quality
2 
Number of departments
2 
Total TTO staff ( FTEs)
1 
Distribution to inventor (%)
1 
Distribution to inventor’s department1 
Total research expenditures ($1 
million)
1 
179.96 
43.50 
30.40 
17.75 
0.40 
0.74 
493.46 
198.38 
24.97 
13.14 
21.03 
0.15 
----- 
604.11 
8.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.60 
0.15 
0.00 
43.93 
1553.00 
86.00 
54.00 
161.00 
1.00 
1.00 
5030.00 
1. 2008-2012, Source: AUTM (2013) 
2. 2005-2006, Source: National Research Council (2011) 
3. Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are for variables before correcting for 
heteroscedasticity 
 The total research expenditures variable is measured as a five-year average 2008-
2012. The variable is displayed in 1 million dollar units as the average university research 
expenditures by a university is $489,040,000.00. There is a relatively high correlation 
between total research expenditures, total TTO staff, and technology disclosures. This is 
expected, as schools that spend more money on research should realize more disclosures 
from that research, and TTOs with larger staffs can have more resources to encourage 
disclosures. 
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Table 5.2 Correlation coefficients for technology disclosures model, N=86 universities 
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Technology 
disclosures
1 
Faculty quality
2 
Number of 
departments
2 
Total TTO staff
1 
Distribution to 
inventor
1 
Distribution to 
inventor’s 
department
1 
Total research 
expenditures
1 
1.00 0.57 
 
1.00 
0.34 
 
0.38 
1.00 
0.91 
 
0.48 
0.39 
 
1.00 
-0.16 
 
-0.06 
-0.30 
 
-0.09 
1.00 
-0.17 
 
-0.10 
0.09 
 
-0.13 
-0.09 
 
1.00 
0.94 
 
0.48 
0.34 
 
0.94 
-0.07 
 
-0.18 
 
 
1.00 
1. 2008-2012, Source: AUTM (2013) 
2. 2005-2006, Source: National Research Council (2011) 
3. Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are for variables before correcting for 
heteroscedasticity 
 
The results in Table 5.3 suggest that over 80 percent of the variation in total 
disclosures across universities can be “explained” by the variables in the model. The 
coefficient for faculty quality is positive and greater than three times its standard error 
and supports hypothesis 2. Although positive, the coefficient for number of departments 
is not large compared to its standard error. The total TTO staff coefficient is more than 
three times its standard error and positive, indicating as the TTO staff size increases, so 
will the number of disclosures. This is consistent with hypothesis 1. The coefficient for 
the distribution to inventor is negative and greater and three times its standard error. 
Although the sign for the distribution to inventor’s department is negative, it is not large 
when compared to its standard error. The negative signs of the distribution coefficients 
are not consistent with hypotheses 4 or 5. The coefficient for total research expenditures 
is positive, and the coefficient is three times as large as its standard error. This is 
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consistent with hypothesis 3. The technology disclosures model has an F-value of 227.20 
with a corrected R-square value of 0.835. 
Table 5.3 Technology disclosures regression results (standard errors in parentheses below estimated 
regression coefficients) N=86 universities 
Variable name
 
OLS
 
GLS
1 
Intercept 
 
Faculty quality
 
 
Number of departments
 
 
Total TTO staff (FTEs)
 
 
Distribution to inventor (%)
 
 
Distribution to inventor’s department 
 
Total research expenditures ($1 million) 
 
R-Square 
65.471
2 
(29.729) 
1.311
3
 
(0.296) 
-1.288
2
 
(0.681) 
2.486
3
 
(0.858) 
-137.950
3
 
(44.869) 
-3.406 
(14.678) 
0.207
3
 
(0.030) 
0.922 
46.121
3 
(12.721) 
0.544
3 
(0.213) 
0.081 
(0.432) 
3.637
3 
(0.779) 
-110.232
3 
(17.602) 
-1.903 
(8.660) 
0.173
3 
(0.028) 
0.835
4
 
1. An EGLS estimator of equation is used to estimate the parameters. Exponential heteroscedasticity is 
corrected using Harvey’s procedure. The natural log of the absolute value of the errors from OLS 
estimation is regressed against all of the independent variables in the original equation. The results of that 
regression are: 
  |  ̂|  
                                                                               
                                                                         
                                    . 
2. Coefficient is greater than two times its standard error. 
3. Coefficient is greater than three times its standard error. 
4. R-square in model corrected for heteroscedasticity is corrected R-square calculated using the following 
formula: 
   
  ̂   ̂    ̅̅̅̅  
         ̅̅̅̅  
    
 
TTO output models 
The descriptive statistics for the TTO outputs equations are displayed in Tables 
5.4 and 5.5. Table 5.4 includes the descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
while Table 5.5 includes the TTO output measures, or dependent variables.  
 The TTO organization, public, land-grant, medical school, and distribution to 
inventor’s department variables are indicator variables. A mean of 0.326 for the TTO 
organization variable indicates that 32.6 percent of the university TTOs in this study have 
a clear TTO mission and readily available statistics. A mean of 0.744 for the public 
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variable indicates that 74.4 percent of the universities in this study are public institutions. 
A mean of 0.500 for the land-grant variable indicates that 50.0 percent of the universities 
in this study are land-grant universities. A mean of 0.674 for the medical school variable 
indicates that 67.4 percent of the universities in this study have a medical school in their 
university system. Just as with the technology disclosures variables, a mean of 0.744 for 
the distribution to inventor’s department indicates that 74.4 percent of the universities in 
this study distribute a share of the licensing revenue to the inventor’s department. 
Table 5.6 includes the correlation coefficients for the dependent variables in the 
TTO output equations. Licenses generating income has a correlation coefficient of 0.813 
with licenses executed. Cumulative active licenses has a correlation coefficient of 0.863 
with licenses executed and 0.861 with licenses generating income. 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics for independent variables in TTO output equations, N=86 universities 
Variable Name Mean
5 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Tech pole score
2 
TTO age (years)
1 
TTO organization
3 
Public
4 
Land-grant
 
Medical school
4 
Distribution to inventor (%)
1 
Distribution to inventor’s department 1 
Technology disclosures
1 
7.845 
28.570 
0.326 
0.744 
0.500 
0.674 
0.402 
0.744 
179.960 
15.033 
14.386 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.146 
--- 
198.976 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
8.00 
100.00 
87.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1553.00 
1. 2008-2012, Source: AUTM (2013) 
2. 2007, Source: Milken Institute (2009) 
3. Source: University TTO websites 
4. 2005-2006, Source: National Research Council (2011) 
5. Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are for variables before correcting for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics dependent variables in TTO output equations , N=86 universities 
Variable Name Mean
2 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Licenses executed
1 
Licensing income received ($1 million)
1 
Licenses generating income
1 
Cumulative active licenses
1 
39.102 
$19.937 
143.791 
304.493 
37.668 
$42.427 
225.696 
338.901 
2.000 
$0.029 
2.800 
6.800 
207.800 
$295.918 
1877.000 
2,112.000 
1. 2008-2012, source: AUTM (2013). 
2. Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are for variables before correcting for 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
Table 5.6 Correlation coefficients for dependent variables in TTO output equations, N=86 universities 
Variable Name 
Licenses 
executed 
License  
income  
Licenses 
generating 
income
 
Cumulative 
active  
licenses
 
Licenses executed
 
Licensing income  
Licenses generating income
 
Cumulative active licenses
 
1.000 0.349 
1.000 
0.813 
0.389 
1.000 
0.863 
0.326 
0.861 
1.000 
AUTM STATT database is the source for all variables in Table 5.6 
 
 Correlation coefficients all TTO output equations can be found in Appendix V. 
Table 5.7 includes results for licenses executed per year and estimated licensing 
income per year for the period of 2008-2012. The variables used in the models “explain” 
nearly 40 percent more of the number of licenses executed versus licensing income. In the 
licenses executed model, the tech coefficient, indicating the proximity to technology 
inducing metropolitan areas, is negative, but not large when compared to its standard 
error. This is not consistent with hypothesis 10. The TTO age coefficient is positive, but 
not large when compared to its standard error, nor are the TTO organization or public 
coefficients. The small value of TTO age and TTO organization compared to their 
standard errors does not support hypotheses 6 or 7, respectively.  
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Table 5.7 Licenses executed and licensing income regression results (standard errors in parentheses below 
estimated regression coefficients) N=86 universities 
 Licenses executed Licensing income 
Variable name OLS GLS
1 
OLS GLS
2 
Intercept 
 
Tech 
 
TTO age (years) 
 
TTO organization 
 
Public 
 
Land-grant 
 
Medical school 
 
Distribution to inventor 
(%) 
 
Distribution to 
inventor’s department  
 
Technology disclosures 
 
R-Square 
22.660 
(14.932) 
0.128 
(0.227) 
0.006 
(0.209) 
2.848 
(6.786) 
8.932 
(7.895) 
-4.250 
(6.757) 
-2.887 
(6.276) 
-30.618 
(20.913) 
 
-0.737 
(6.439) 
 
0.137
4 
(0.017) 
0.597 
24.098
 
(12.046) 
-0.077 
(0.187) 
0.137 
(0.241) 
0.034 
(5.407) 
-0.065 
(5.959) 
-5.525 
(5.468) 
-11.913
3 
(6.298) 
-14.195 
(12.820) 
 
-2.522 
(4.704) 
 
0.173
4 
(0.020) 
0.574
5 
14.594 
(22.381) 
0.202 
(0.340) 
0.265 
(0.314) 
-7.834 
(10.171) 
-21.908
3 
(11.834) 
-2.969
 
(10.129) 
9.771 
(9.407) 
-4.914 
(31.347) 
 
-1.895 
(9.652) 
 
0.074
4 
(0.025) 
0.286 
-2.020 
(9.412) 
0.184 
(0.298) 
0.112 
(0.151) 
0.014 
(5.241) 
-5.739 
(6.160) 
-4.045 
(3.809) 
0.935 
(3.668) 
12.813 
(11.193) 
 
-0.173 
(4.387) 
 
0.078
4 
(0.022) 
0.185
5 
1. An EGLS estimator of equation is used to estimate the parameters. Exponential heteroscedasticity is 
corrected using Harvey’s procedure. The natural log of the absolute value of the errors from OLS 
estimation is regressed against all of the independent variables in the original equation. The results of that 
regression are: 
  |  ̂|                                                                   
                                                                 
                                            
                                          
2. An EGLS estimator of equation is used to estimate the parameters. Exponential heteroscedasticity is 
corrected using Harvey’s procedure. The natural log of the absolute value of the errors from OLS 
estimation is regressed against all of the independent variables in the original equation. The results of that 
regression are: 
  |  ̂|                                                                    
                                                                 
                                           
                                          
3. Coefficient is greater than two times its standard error. 
4. Coefficient is greater than three times its standard error. 
5. R-square in models corrected for heteroscedasticity is corrected R-square calculated using the following 
formula: 
   
  ̂   ̂    ̅̅̅̅  
         ̅̅̅̅  
    
 
In Table 5.7, the land-grant coefficient is negative in the licenses executed model, 
but not large when compared to its standard error, which does not support hypothesis 11. 
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The medical school coefficient is negative, and is two times its standard error. The 
distribution to inventor and distribution to inventor’s department coefficients are both 
negative, but not large when compared to their standard errors. This does not support 
hypothesis 8 or 9, respectively. However, the coefficient for the technology disclosures 
variable is positive and greater than three times its standard error, both signifying that as 
the number of disclosures increases so does the TTO output licenses executed, and 
supporting hypothesis 12. The licenses executed model has an F-value of 35.92 with a 
corrected R-square of 0.574. 
Also included in table 5.7 is a model estimating licensing income that has an F-
value of 5.30 with a corrected R-square of 0.185. The tech and TTO age coefficients are 
both positive, but small when compared to their standard errors. The small values 
compared to their standard errors do not support hypothesis 10 or 6, respectively. The 
TTO organization coefficient is positive, but not large compared to its standard error, 
which does not support hypothesis 7. The public coefficient is negative, but not large 
when compared to its standard error. The land-grant coefficient is negative, but not large 
when compared to its standard error. This does not support hypothesis 11.The coefficient 
signifying the presence of a medical school is positive, but not large when compared to 
its standard error. Both distribution coefficients, distribution to inventor and distribution 
to inventor’s department, are not large when compared to their standard errors. Even 
though the distribution to inventor coefficient is positive, the small coefficient compared 
to the standard error does not support hypothesis 8. The negative sign of the distribution 
to inventor’s department coefficient does not support hypothesis 9. The coefficient for 
technology disclosures is positive and greater than three times its standard error, 
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supporting hypothesis 12. As the number disclosures increases, licensing income is 
expected to increase as well. 
In the licenses generating income model from table 5.8, the tech coefficient is 
negative but not large when compared to its standard error. This is not consistent with 
hypothesis 10. Likewise, the TTO age coefficient is negative, but not large when 
compared to its standard error. This does not support hypothesis 6.  The TTO 
organization coefficient is negative, but small compared to its standard error which does 
not support hypothesis 7. The public coefficient is also negative, but small when 
compared to its standard error. The land-grant coefficient is positive, but not large when 
compared to its standard error, which does not support hypothesis 11. Alternatively, the 
medical school coefficient is negative and greater than two times its standard error. The 
distribution to inventor coefficient is positive, but not large when compared to its 
standard error, which does not support hypothesis 8. The distribution to inventor’s 
department coefficient is negative, but not large when compared to its standard error 
which does not support hypothesis 9. The coefficient for the technology disclosures 
variable is positive and greater than three times its standard error, signifying that as the 
number of disclosures increases so does the number of licenses generating income. This 
supports hypothesis 12. The licenses generating income model has an F-value of 19.37 
with a corrected R-square of 0.469. 
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Table 5.8 Licenses generating income and cumulative active licenses regression results (standard errors in 
parentheses below estimated regression coefficients) N=86 universities 
 Licenses generating income Cumulative active licenses 
Variable name OLS GLS
1 
OLS GLS
2 
Intercept 
 
Tech 
 
TTO age (years) 
 
TTO organization 
 
Public 
 
Land-grant 
 
Medical school 
 
Distribution to inventor 
(%) 
 
Distribution to 
inventor’s department  
 
Technology disclosures 
 
R-Square 
-127.203
3 
(61.513) 
0.486 
(0.933) 
0.068 
(0.863) 
-28.639 
(27.956) 
16.055 
(32.526) 
58.420 
(27.838) 
-6.964 
(25.856) 
88.082 
(86.156) 
 
17.388 
(26.527) 
 
1.054
4 
(0.069) 
0.810 
0.477
 
(42.985) 
-0.157 
(1.362) 
-0.003 
(0.691) 
-9.422 
(23.934) 
-12.921 
(28.132) 
19.995 
(17.395) 
-33.068
3 
(16.753) 
47.505
 
(51.117) 
 
-17.303 
(20.038) 
 
0.914
4 
(0.102) 
0.469
5 
81.248
 
(133.595) 
0.860 
(2.027) 
1.322 
(1.874) 
26.512 
(60.715) 
-7.952 
(70.639) 
22.686 
(60.458) 
11.820 
(56.153) 
-138.659 
(187.113) 
 
-8.813 
(57.613) 
 
1.217
4 
(0.151) 
0.602 
98.305
 
(87.371) 
0.397 
(2.769) 
1.410 
(1.405) 
25.289 
(48.648) 
-43.346 
(57.180) 
15.136 
(35.356) 
-40.322 
(34.053) 
-0.527
 
(103.899) 
 
-55.861 
(40.729) 
 
1.282
4 
(0.207) 
0.236
5 
1. An EGLS estimator of equation is used to estimate the parameters. Exponential heteroscedasticity is 
corrected using Harvey’s procedure. The natural log of the absolute value of the errors from OLS 
estimation is regressed against all of the independent variables in the original equation. The results of that 
regression are: 
  |  ̂|                                                                 
                                                                 
                                            
                                         
2. An EGLS estimator of equation is used to estimate the parameters. Exponential heteroscedasticity is 
corrected using Harvey’s procedure. The natural log of the absolute value of the errors from OLS 
estimation is regressed against all of the independent variables in the original equation. The results of that 
regression are: 
  |  ̂|                                                                    
                                                                  
                                           
                                         
3. Coefficient is greater than two times its standard error. 
4. Coefficient is greater than three times its standard error. 
5. R-square in models corrected for heteroscedasticity is corrected R-square calculated using the 
following formula: 
   
  ̂   ̂    ̅̅̅̅  
         ̅̅̅̅  
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Also included in table 5.8, the tech coefficient is positive, but not large when 
compared to its standard error in the cumulative active licenses model. This is not 
consistent with hypothesis 10. Likewise, the TTO age and TTO organization coefficients 
are positive, but not large when compared to their standard errors. This does not support 
hypotheses 8 or 9, respectively. The public coefficient is negative, but small when 
compared to its standard error. The land-grant coefficient is positive, but not large when 
compared to its standard error, which does not support hypothesis 11. The medical school 
coefficient is negative, but not large when compared to its standard error. The 
distribution to inventor coefficient is negative, but not large when compared to its 
standard error, thus not supporting hypothesis 8. The distribution to inventor’s 
department coefficient is also negative, but not large when compared to its standard error, 
which does not support hypothesis 9. The coefficient for the technology disclosures 
variable is positive and greater than three times its standard error, signifying that as the 
number of disclosures increases so does the number of cumulative active licenses. This 
supports hypothesis 12. The cumulative active licenses model has an F-value of 17.18 
with a corrected R-square of 0.236. 
The sign of the coefficient for each variable in each of the four TTO output 
models as well as the coefficient size in relation to its standard error is included in table 
5.9. 
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Table 5.9 TTO output models summary 
Variable 
Licenses 
executed 
Licensing 
income 
Licenses 
generating 
income 
Cumulative 
active 
licenses 
Intercept 
 
Tech 
 
TTO age (years) 
 
TTO organization 
 
Public 
 
Land-grant 
 
Medical school 
 
Distribution to inventor  
 
Distribution to inventor department  
 
Technology disclosures 
 
F-Value 
 
R-Square 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-* 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+** 
 
35.92
1 
 
0.574 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+** 
 
5.30
1 
 
0.185 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
-* 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+** 
 
19.37
1 
 
0.469 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+** 
 
17.18
1 
 
0.236 
* Coefficient is greater than two times its standard error. 
** Coefficient is greater than three times its standard error. 
1. F-Values are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The overwhelming theme to all models is that TTO outputs are definitely 
positively related to technology disclosures. Each coefficient for technology disclosures 
is positive and greater than three times its standard error. In two of the TTO output 
models, licensing income, and cumulative active licenses, the technology disclosures 
coefficient is the only coefficient that is larger than its standard error. In the licenses 
executed and licenses generating income models, the medical school coefficient exhibits 
a negative relationship to the dependent variable, with the coefficient two times its 
standard error. In order to confirm the assumption that the error terms for technology 
disclosures and licenses executed models are independent, the error terms were tested for 
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contemporaneous correlation. The error terms were found to only be correlated at         -
0.215, which is satisfactory for this study.  
 Correlation matrices for all TTO output model independent and dependent 
variables can be found in Appendix V. A full description of Harvey’s procedure used to 
correct for heteroscedasticity is in Appendix VI. Additionally, the SAS code used for the 
models in this study can be found in Appendix VII. 
 
59 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
 
Technology disclosures conclusions 
 
 The expectations and goals for university scientists, TTO administrators, and 
university administrators are not always in alignment. University scientists may prefer to 
disseminate their findings via publication, while the TTO and university administration 
would prefer, when applicable, to disclose the information in the form of a patent and/or 
license the technology to a firm willing to market the technology for a financial return to 
the university.  
1. This study tests whether Number of technology disclosures are related to 
characteristics of research universities,, 
2. Technology transfer outputs are related to university policies and incentives, 
and 
3. Technology transfer outputs are related to regional and local characteristics. 
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Table 6.1 Technology disclosures hypotheses support 
 Hypotheses 
Model “TTO FTEs” 
“Faculty 
quality” 
“Research 
expenditures” 
“Faculty 
rewards 
(inventor)” 
“Faculty 
rewards 
(department)” 
Technology 
disclosures 
+** +** +** -** - 
+ or – signifies sign of coefficient in estimation model. 
* signifies coefficient is greater than two times its standard error. 
**signifies coefficient is greater than three times its standard error. 
 
 As shown by table 6.1, this study found a strong relationship between the Total 
TTO staff and the number of technology disclosures to support hypothesis 1. A larger 
workforce allows a TTO to increase their educational efforts aimed at university scientist 
disclosures and give the disclosures the time and effort necessary to determine the steps 
that must be taken after each disclosure.  Hypothesis 2 is that technology disclosures and 
faculty quality are positively related, and this hypothesis is supported by the estimated 
model. The coefficient for faculty quality is positive and greater than three times its 
standard error, indicating that higher quality faculty employed at a university results in a 
higher number of technology disclosures. Hypothesis 3 is that technology disclosures are 
positively related to total research expenditures. As table 6.1 illustrates, this hypothesis is 
strongly supported by the model, as the coefficient for total research expenditures is 
positive and greater than three times its standard error. More spending on research 
facilities, equipment, and personnel results in a higher number of technology disclosures. 
Even though the distribution to inventor coefficient, or licensing income distribution to 
the inventor, is greater than three times its standard error, its coefficient is negative. This 
does not support hypothesis 4 that is that technology disclosures is positively related to 
faculty incentives to the inventor.  Hypothesis 5, that technology disclosures are 
positively related to faculty departmental rewards. This study did not find support for this 
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hypothesis. The coefficient for distribution to inventor’s department is negative and not 
large when compared to its standard error. 
The inverse relationship between faculty rewards and technology disclosures 
reinforces the notion that faculty prefer to disseminate their findings in methods other 
than as intellectual property (Jensen et al., 2003). It is also possible that the returns to 
publications are better understood while the perceived expected returns to disclosure and 
patenting are uncertain and in the distant future. Faculty may also see their role as 
advancing science through publication rather than advancing science through disclosure, 
patenting and/or commercialization. 
 The remaining models estimated evaluated contained variables pertaining to 
hypotheses 5 through 10. Table 6.2 summarizes each model estimated and the support for 
each hypothesis.  
TTO output conclusions 
Table 6.2 summarizes each TTO output model and the support of each hypothesis. 
The TTO output models do not express strong support for hypothesis 6, or that TTO 
outputs are positively related to the age of the TTO. The signs of the TTO age coefficient 
differ throughout the models, but in no model is the coefficient greater than its standard 
error.  Hypothesis 7 is that a TTO with a clear licensing mission will have a positive 
relationship with TTO output. Similar to the TTO age coefficient, there is not strong 
support for this hypothesis, as in no model is the TTO organization coefficient larger than 
its standard error. 
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Table 6.2 TTO output hypotheses support 
 Dependent variables 
Hypotheses 
Licenses 
executed 
Licensing 
income 
Licenses 
generating 
income 
Cumulative 
active licenses 
TTO age 
 
TTO mission 
 
Faculty rewards (inventor) 
 
Faculty rewards 
 (department) 
 
High tech locations 
 
Land-grant university 
 
Technology disclosures 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+** 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+** 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+** 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+** 
+ or – signifies sign of coefficient in estimation model. 
* signifies coefficient is greater than two times its standard error. 
**signifies coefficient is greater than three times its standard error. 
 
 Hypotheses 8 and 9 are that TTO outputs will have a positive relationship with 
faculty rewards. The TTO output models do not express strong support for either 
hypothesis. Regarding hypothesis 8, the sign of the distribution to inventor coefficient is 
positive in only one model, and in no model is the coefficient large when compared to its 
standard error.  When examining the distribution to inventor’s department, or hypothesis 
9, in only one model is the coefficient positive, and the coefficient is not large when 
compared to its standard error in any model.  
 Hypothesis 10 is that universities in high-tech metropolitan areas will have higher 
TTO outputs. The sign of the tech coefficient differs in the models and is not large when 
compared to its standard error, thus not supporting the hypothesis.  Friedman and 
Silberman (2003) found that location in a high-tech area is extremely important because 
of the private sector research and spillover benefits to the university. However, without 
proper policies in place to benefit from the technical concentration, the university will not 
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realize that advantage. This could also be an indication that the technical market is less 
localized than 20 years ago and is not influenced by a university’s location relative to 
tech-based companies.  
Hypothesis 11 is that land-grant universities and TTO output will have a positive 
relationship. However, the land-grant coefficient is positive in only two of the models, 
and the coefficient is not large when compared to its standard error in any of the four 
TTO output models. 
 Even though previous literature suggests that less than 50 percent of all inventions 
are disclosed, hypothesis 12 is that technology disclosures will exhibit a positive 
relationship with TTO outputs. This hypothesis is strongly supported as the technology 
disclosures coefficient is positive and greater than three times its standard error in every 
TTO output model. The average number of technology disclosures at the research 
universities evaluated has increased by 176 percent since the AUTM started collecting 
data from TTOs in 1991 and 60 percent since 2001. Technology disclosures increased 
just over 22 percent in the period evaluated in this study, from 2008 to 2012. Given the 
increase in disclosures, it can be inferred that disclosures have become much more 
important over the past two decades. It also leads to the conclusion that the TTO quality 
must be high, and very adept at converting these disclosures to TTO outputs.  
Implications for further research 
 This study confirms the notion that technology disclosures are extremely 
important to university TTOs (Carlsson & Fridh, 2002; Friedman & Silberman, 2003; 
Thursby et al., 2001). It additionally illustrates that disclosures have become even more 
important in the last decade. Additional research should review the quality of the 
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disclosures, or stage of the technology at the time of the disclosure in regards to how 
close the technology is to a marketable product. AUTM data for 2008-2012 indicates 
that, on average, universities spend just under $500,000,000.00 each year on research 
expenses, yet only receive just under $20,000,000.00.Clearly, there are educational 
benefits from the research and some research may influence business outcomes that are 
not be adequately measured by licensing revenues or equity positions. Developing better 
measures of the benefits and costs of research at universities is needed.  
 Additionally, further research should examine the propensity for faculty to 
disclose intellectual property compared to publishing the technology in a journal or 
through a research  presentation. Research has previously been conducted regarding 
faculty utility of disclosure at different stages of the research process, and it would be 
beneficial to examine each alternative available to faculty at the different stages of 
research and the utility gained from each. Other areas of future research should include 
examination of faculty tenure and promotion criteria and the extent to which disclosures, 
patents, and commercialization are included in the definitions of scholarship. In a 2003 
journal article (Siegel et al.), a department chair stated that, “It’s the height of hypocrisy 
for universities to claim that they value technology transfer, or that it’s supposed to be a 
top institutional priority, and then fail to reward it in their promotion and tenure 
decisions. At some point we’ve got to resolve this discrepancy.” Siegel et al. (2003) also 
note a need for TTO staff compensation representative of the licenses they execute, 
bringing attention to the fact that fear of a bad deal may outweigh the benefit of a good 
deal. The importance of intellectual property, technology disclosures, and 
commercialization based on technology is still relatively new when compared to the total 
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age of many universities. It would be beneficial to determine what types of information 
dissemination is rewarded in faculty tenure and promotion criteria, and if there is a 
greater benefit for different types of information disclosure. This would be time 
consuming considering each department establishes its own tenure and promotion 
criteria, but would be a very informative and important endeavor. In the same vein, TTO 
rewards and their effects on TTO output could reveal significant policies and aid 
universities in gaining a greater return on their research investment. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
Appendix I – Universities included in study 
Universities included in five and ten-year datasets 
Universities in five-year dataset University in ten-year dataset 
Obs University Obs University 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Arizona State University 
Auburn University* 
Boston University 
California Institute of Technology 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Case Western Reserve University 
Clemson University* 
Colorado State University* 
Columbia University
a 
Cornell University* 
Dartmouth College 
Duke University 
Emory University 
Florida State University 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Harvard University 
Indiana University 
Iowa State University* 
Johns Hopkins University 
Kansas State University* 
Louisiana State University
a* 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Michigan State University* 
Mississippi State University* 
Montana State University* 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine of NYU 
New Mexico State University
a* 
New York University 
North Carolina State University* 
North Dakota State University* 
Northwestern University 
Ohio State University* 
Oklahoma State University* 
Oregon State University* 
Penn State University* 
Purdue University* 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Arizona State University 
Auburn University 
Boston University 
California Institute of Technology 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Case Western Reserve University 
Clemson University 
Colorado State University 
Cornell University  
Dartmouth College 
Duke University 
Emory University 
Florida State University 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Harvard University 
Indiana University 
Iowa State University 
Johns Hopkins University 
Kansas State University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Michigan State University 
Mississippi State University 
Montana State University 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine of NYU 
New York University 
North Carolina State University 
North Dakota State University 
Northwestern University 
Ohio State University 
Oklahoma State University 
Oregon State University 
Penn State University 
Purdue University 
Rice University 
Rutgers University 
Tulane University 
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Universities included in five and ten-year datasets continued 
Universities in five-year dataset University in ten-year dataset 
Obs University Obs University 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
 
Rice University 
Rutgers University* 
Stanford University
a 
Texas A&M University
a* 
Tulane University 
University of Alabama
a 
University of Arizona* 
University of Arkansas
a* 
University of California System* 
University of Chicago 
University of Colorado 
University of Connecticut* 
University of Florida* 
University of Georgia* 
University of Hawaii* 
University of Idaho* 
University of Illinois* 
University of Iowa 
University of Kansas 
University of Kentucky* 
University of Maryland* 
University of Massachusetts* 
University of Michigan 
University of Minnesota* 
University of Mississippi 
University of Missouri* 
University of Nebraska* 
University of Nevada
a* 
University of New Hampshire* 
University of New Mexico 
University of North Carolina  
University of Oklahoma 
University of Oregon 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pittsburgh 
University of Rochester 
University of South Carolina
a 
University of Southern California 
University of Tennessee* 
University of Texas 
University of Utah 
 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
 
76 
77 
University of Arizona 
University of California System 
University of Chicago 
University of Colorado 
University of Connecticut 
University of Florida 
University of Georgia 
University of Hawaii 
University of Idaho 
University of Illinois 
University of Iowa 
University of Kansas 
University of Kentucky 
University of Maryland 
University of Massachusetts 
University of Michigan 
University of Minnesota 
University of Mississippi 
University of Missouri 
University of Nebraska 
University of New Hampshire 
University of New Mexico 
University of North Carolina  
University of Oklahoma 
University of Oregon 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pittsburgh 
University of Rochester 
University of Southern California 
University of Tennessee 
University of Texas  
University of Utah 
University of Vermont 
University of Virginia 
University of Washington 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Utah State University 
Vanderbilt University 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University 
Washington State University 
Washington University in St. Louis 
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Universities included in five and ten-year datasets continued 
Universities in five-year dataset University in ten-year dataset 
Obs University Obs University 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
 
85 
86 
87 
University of Vermont* 
University of Virginia 
University of Washington 
University of Wisconsin-Madison* 
Utah State University* 
Vanderbilt University 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University* 
Washington State University* 
Washington University in St. Louis 
West Virginia University
b*
 
  
a. Universities in bolded type are universities added when the time period is reduced to five years, 2008-
2012. 
b. Universities in italicized type are universities that are not included in the National Research Council 
updated Ph.D.-granting department rankings, 2005-2006. 
*Denotes land-grant universities established by Morrill Act of 1862. 
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Appendix II – Ph.D.-granting science departments in study 
Ph.D.-granting science departments 
Broad Field Field 
Number of 
programs 
Agricultural sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biological and health sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engineering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Physical and mathematical 
sciences 
Animal sciences 
Entomology 
Food science 
Forestry and forest sciences 
Nutrition 
Plant sciences 
 
Biochemistry, biophysics, and structural biology 
Biology/integrated biology/integrated biomedical 
sciences 
Cell and developmental biology 
Ecology and evolutionary biology 
Genetics and genomics 
Immunology and infectious diseases 
Kinesiology 
Microbiology 
Neuroscience and neurobiology 
Nursing 
Pharmacology, toxicology, and environmental health 
Physiology 
Public health 
 
Aerospace engineering 
Biomedical engineering and bioengineering 
Chemical engineering 
Civil and environmental engineering 
Electrical and computer engineering 
Materials science and engineering 
Mechanical engineering 
Operations research, systems engineering, and 
industrial engineering 
 
Applied mathematics 
Astrophysics and astronomy 
Chemistry 
Computer sciences 
Earth sciences 
Mathematics 
Oceanography, atmospheric sciences, and 
meteorology 
Physics 
Statistics and probability 
60 
28 
31 
33 
44 
116 
 
157 
121 
 
122 
94 
65 
78 
41 
74 
94 
52 
116 
63 
91 
 
31 
74 
106 
130 
136 
83 
127 
72 
 
 
33 
33 
178 
127 
141 
127 
50 
 
161 
61 
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Appendix III – Metropolitan area tech pole scores 
University metropolitan area areas and tech pole scores 
University City State Tech pole scores 
Arizona State University 
Auburn University 
Boston University 
California Institute of Technology 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Case Western Reserve University 
Clemson University 
Colorado State University 
Columbia University 
Cornell University 
Dartmouth College 
Duke University 
Emory University 
Florida State University 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Harvard University 
Indiana University 
Iowa State University 
Johns Hopkins University 
Kansas State University 
Louisiana State University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Michigan State University 
Mississippi State University 
Montana State University 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine of NYU 
New Mexico State University 
New York University 
North Carolina State University 
North Dakota State University 
Northwestern University 
Ohio State University 
Oklahoma State University 
Oregon State University 
Penn State University 
Purdue University 
Rice University 
Rutgers University 
Stanford University 
Texas A&M University 
Tulane University 
University of Alabama 
University of Arizona 
University of Arkansas 
University of California System 
TEMPE 
AUBURN UNIVERSITY 
BOSTON 
PASADENA 
PITTSBURGH 
CLEVELAND 
CLEMSON 
FORT COLLINS 
NEW YORK 
ITHACA 
HANOVER 
DURHAM 
ATLANTA 
TALLAHASSEE 
ATLANTA 
CAMBRIDGE 
BLOOMINGTON 
AMES 
BALTIMORE 
MANHATTAN 
BATON ROUGE 
CAMBRIDGE 
EAST LANSING 
MISSISSIPPI STATE 
BOZEMAN 
NEW YORK 
LAS CRUCES 
NEW YORK 
RALEIGH 
FARGO 
EVANSTON 
COLUMBUS 
STILLWATER 
CORVALLIS 
UNIVERSITY PARK 
WEST LAFAYETTE 
HOUSTON 
NEW BRUNSWICK 
STANFORD 
COLLEGE STATION 
NEW ORLEANS 
TUSCALOOSA 
TUCSON 
FAYETTEVILLE 
BERKELEY 
AZ 
AL 
MA 
CA 
PA 
OH 
SC 
CO 
NY 
NY 
NH 
NC 
GA 
FL 
GA 
MA 
IN 
IA 
MD 
KS 
LA 
MA 
MI 
MS 
MT 
NY 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
IL 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
IN 
TX 
NJ 
CA 
TX 
LA 
AL 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
10.4 
0.9 
3.8 
40.2 
4.3 
2.3 
1.0 
1.5 
16.8 
0.2 
3.7 
9.7 
14.0 
0.5 
14.0 
45.2 
0.6 
0.1 
8.3 
0.1 
0.7 
45.2 
0.3 
1.1 
0.1 
16.8 
0.2 
16.8 
5.3 
0.4 
13.3 
4.4 
1.3 
0.6 
0.3 
0.1 
11.6 
9.3 
100.0 
0.2 
0.9 
0.1 
3.3 
0.4 
16.1 
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University metropolitan area areas and tech pole scores continued 
University City State Tech pole scores 
University of Chicago 
University of Colorado 
University of Connecticut 
University of Florida 
University of Georgia 
University of Hawaii 
University of Idaho 
University of Illinois-Chicago and Urbana 
University of Iowa 
University of Kansas 
University of Kentucky 
University of Maryland 
University of Massachusetts 
University of Michigan 
University of Minnesota 
University of Mississippi 
University of Missouri 
University of Nebraska 
University of Nevada 
University of New Hampshire 
University of New Mexico 
University of North Carolina 
University of Oklahoma 
University of Oregon 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pittsburgh 
University of Rochester 
University of South Carolina 
University of Southern California 
University of Tennessee 
University of Texas 
University of Utah 
University of Vermont 
University of Virginia 
University of Washington 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Utah State University 
Vanderbilt University 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
Washington State University 
Washington University in St. Louis 
CHICAGO 
BOULDER 
STORRS 
GAINESVILLE 
ATHENS 
HONOLULU 
MOSCOW 
CHAMPAIGN 
IOWA CITY 
LAWRENCE 
LEXINGTON 
COLLEGE PARK 
AMHERST 
ANN ARBOR 
MINNEAPOLIS 
UNIVERSITY 
COLUMBIA 
LINCOLN 
RENO 
DURHAM 
ALBUQUERQUE 
CHAPEL HILL 
NORMAN 
EUGENE 
PHILADELPHIA 
PITTSBURGH 
ROCHESTER 
COLUMBIA 
LOS ANGELES 
KNOXVILLE 
AUSTIN 
SALT LAKE CITY 
BURLINGTON 
CHARLOTTESVILLE 
SEATTLE 
MADISON 
LOGAN 
NASHVILLE 
BLACKSBURG 
PULLMAN 
SAINT LOUIS 
IL 
CO 
CT 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IA 
KS 
KY 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NM 
NC 
OK 
OR 
PA 
PA 
NY 
SC 
CA 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VT 
VA 
WA 
WI 
UT 
TN 
VA 
WA 
MO 
13.3 
9.3 
4.7 
0.2 
0.1 
0.9 
0.5 
0.2 
0.3 
0.0 
1.3 
41.8 
3.8 
1.5 
11.9 
0.7 
0.1 
0.6 
0.3 
3.8 
5.2 
5.3 
1.2 
0.4 
14.4 
4.3 
3.7 
0.5 
40.2 
0.8 
11.6 
5.6 
1.3 
0.4 
46.6 
2.1 
0.3 
1.7 
0.2 
0.5 
6.7 
Source: R. K. Devol, Kevin; Bedroussian, Armen; Yeo, Benjamin (2009) 
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Appendix IV – Net licensing income distribution to inventor 
Net licensing income distribution to inventor  
University 
Tier 1 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit 
($) 
Tier 2 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit  
($) 
Tier 3 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit  
($) 
Tier 4 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit 
($) 
Tier 5 
share 
(%) 
Share at 
$100K 
income 
(%) 
Arizona State University 
Auburn University 
Boston University 
California Institute of Technology 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Case Western Reserve University 
Clemson University 
Colorado State University 
Columbia University 
Cornell University 
Dartmouth College 
Duke University 
Emory University 
Florida State University 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Harvard University 
Indiana University 
Iowa State University 
Johns Hopkins University 
Kansas State University 
Louisiana State University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Michigan State University 
Mississippi State University 
Montana State University 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine of NYU 
New Mexico State University 
New York University 
North Carolina State University 
North Dakota State University 
42.50  
 40.00  
 30.00  
 25.00  
 50.00  
 50.00  
 85.00  
 35.00  
 40.00  
 33.33  
 42.50  
 50.00  
100.00  
 85.00 
100.00  
 35.00  
 35.00  
 28.33  
 35.00  
 25.00  
 40.00  
 28.05 
100.00 
100.00  
 66.66  
100.00  
 50.00  
 42.50  
 25.00  
 30.00   
10000 
 
 
 
 
100000 
10000 
 
100000 
 
 
500000 
25000 
10000 
2500 
 
 
 
300000 
 
 
 
5000 
5000 
30000 
 
 
 
 
 
28.33  
 
 
 
 
 42.50  
 34.00  
 
 20.00  
 
 
 33.00  
 33.00  
 40.00  
 33.00  
 
 
 
 35.00  
 
 
 
 33.00  
 50.00  
 50.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000000 
4000000 
 
500000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105000 
100000 
60000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25.00  
 25.00  
 
 33.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30.00  
 40.00  
 33.33  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1000000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
505000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33.33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1005000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.00 
29.75  
 40.00  
 30.00  
 25.00  
 50.00  
 50.00  
 39.10  
 35.00  
 40.00  
 33.33  
 42.50  
 50.00  
 49.75  
 44.50  
 34.68  
 35.00  
 35.00  
 28.33  
 35.00  
 25.00  
 40.00  
 28.05  
 36.35  
 52.50  
 48.33  
 100.00  
 50.00  
 42.50  
 25.00  
 30.00   
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Net licensing income distribution to inventor continued 
University 
Tier 1 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit 
($) 
Tier 2 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit  
($) 
Tier 3 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit  
($) 
Tier 4 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit 
($) 
Tier 5 
share 
(%) 
Share at 
$100K 
income 
(%) 
Northwestern University 
Ohio State University 
Oklahoma State University 
Oregon State University 
Penn State University 
Purdue University 
Rice University 
Rutgers University 
Stanford University 
Texas A&M University 
Tulane University 
University of Alabama 
University of Arizona 
University of Arkansas 
University of California System 
University of Chicago 
University of Colorado 
University of Connecticut 
University of Florida 
University of Georgia 
University of Hawaii 
University of Idaho 
University of Illinois-Chicago and Urbana 
University of Iowa 
University of Kansas 
University of Kentucky 
University of Maryland 
University of Massachusetts 
University of Michigan 
University of Minnesota 
University of Mississippi 
University of Missouri 
26.66  
 50.00  
 50.00  
 40.00  
 40.00  
 33.33  
 37.50 
100.00  
 28.33  
 37.50  
 42.50  
 42.50  
 21.25  
 50.00  
 42.50 
100.00  
 25.00  
 33.33  
 40.00 
100.00  
 66.67  
 40.00  
 40.00 
100.00  
 33.33  
 40.00  
 50.00  
 30.00  
 50.00  
 28.33 
100.00  
 33.33  
50000 
75000 
 
50000 
 
 
 
5000 
 
 
 
 
 
200000 
100000 
 
 
 
500000 
10000 
100000 
  
  
100000 
 
 
 
 
200000 
 
5000 
 
26.66  
 33.33  
 
 35.00  
 
 
 
 25.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 35.00  
 29.75  
 
 
 
 25.00  
 25.00  
 50.00  
 
 
 25.00  
 
 
 
 
 30.00  
 
 45.00  
 
500000 
 
 
100000 
 
 
 
100000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
500000 
 
 
 
 
 
200000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000000 
 
100000 
 
26.66  
 
 
 30.00  
 
 
 
 28.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 41.67  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30.00  
 
 25.00  
500000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33.33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26.66  
 45.83  
 50.00  
 37.50  
 40.00  
 33.33  
 37.50  
 28.75  
 28.33  
 37.50  
 42.50  
 42.50  
 21.25  
 50.00  
 42.50  
 100.00  
 25.00  
 33.33  
 40.00  
 32.50  
 66.67  
 40.00  
 40.00  
 100.00  
 33.33  
 40.00  
 50.00  
 30.00  
 50.00  
 28.33  
 47.75  
 33.33  
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Net licensing income distribution to inventor continued 
University 
Tier 1 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit 
($) 
Tier 2 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit  
($) 
Tier 3 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit  
($) 
Tier 4 
share 
(%) 
Tier 1 
limit 
($) 
Tier 5 
share 
(%) 
Share at 
$100K 
income 
(%) 
University of Nebraska 
University of Nevada 
University of New Hampshire 
University of New Mexico 
University of North Carolina 
University of Oklahoma 
University of Oregon 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pittsburgh 
University of Rochester 
University of South Carolina 
University of Southern California 
University of Tennessee 
University of Texas 
University of Utah 
University of Vermont 
University of Virginia 
University of Washington 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Utah State University 
Vanderbilt University 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University 
Washington State University 
Washington University in St. Louis 
33.33  
 51.00  
 30.00  
 40.00  
 15.00  
 35.00  
 40.00  
 28.50  
 30.00  
 50.00  
 40.00  
 28.33 
100.00  
 50.00  
 40.00  
 50.00  
 35.00  
 26.67  
 20.00  
 42.50  
 50.00  
 50.00  
 
 80.00  
 35.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50000 
 
 
50000 
 
 
5000 
 
100000 
 
 
 
 
500000 
100000 
 
 
10000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35.00  
 
 
 40.00  
 
 
 40.00  
 
 35.00  
 
 
 
 
 34.00  
 40.00  
 
  
40.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100000 
 
 
250000 
 
 
1000000 
 
300000 
 
 
 
 
2000000 
 
 
 
200000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30.00  
 
 
 35.00  
 
 
 35.00  
 
 33.33  
 
 
 
 
 34.00  
 
 
 
 20.00 
    33.33  
 51.00  
 30.00  
 40.00  
 15.00  
 35.00  
 37.50  
 28.50  
 30.00  
 45.00  
 40.00  
 28.33  
 43.00  
 50.00  
 40.00  
 50.00  
 35.00  
 26.67  
 20.00  
 42.50  
 50.00  
 50.00  
  
40.00  
 35.00 
Source: AUTM (2013) 
1. No dollar amount to the right of tier distribution percentage signifies the highest tier for income distribution and there is no upper limit to the 
specified distribution percentage. 
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Appendix V – Correlation coefficients for TTO output equations 
Correlation coefficients for TTO output equation dependent and independent variables 
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t 
T
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o
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g
y
 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
Licenses executed 
Licensing revenue 
Licenses generating income 
Cumulative active licenses 
Tech 
TTO age 
TTO organization 
Public 
Land-grant 
Medical school 
Distribution to inventor  
Distribution to inventor 
department 
Technology disclosures 
1.000 0.349 
1.000 
0.813 
0.389 
1.000 
0.863 
0.326 
0.861 
1.000 
0.346 
0.332 
0.333 
0.359 
1.000 
0.206 
0.189 
0.211 
0.259 
0.205 
1.000 
0.278 
0.154 
0.273 
0.315 
0.294 
0.215 
1.000 
-0.056 
-0.339 
-0.034 
-0.131 
-0.432 
-0.116 
-0.218 
1.000 
-0.069 
-0.218 
0.060 
-0.050 
-0.333 
0.074 
-0.149 
0.533 
1.000 
0.098 
0.212 
0.137 
0.151 
0.110 
-0.071 
0.165 
-0.180 
-0.248 
1.000 
-0.231 
-0.097 
-0.123 
-0.183 
-0.128 
-0.239 
0.181 
0.002 
-0.102 
0.144 
1.000 
-0.126 
-0.075 
-0.114 
-0.130 
-0.040 
-0.038 
-0.104 
0.023 
0.053 
0.048 
-0.091 
1.000 
0.758 
0.429 
0.885 
0.768 
0.414 
0.238 
0.372 
-0.147 
-0.091 
0.201 
-0.157 
-0.167 
1.000 
Source: AUTM (2008-2012) 
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Appendix VI – Calculation details 
The equation will be corrected for heteroscedasticity using Harvey’s procedure (Harvey, 
1976). An OLS model will be estimated for technology disclosures (1). The natural log of 
the error terms of the OLS model will be regressed against the original variables in the 
OLS model (2). A weight will then be calculated by taking the anti-log of the predicted 
natural log of error terms from equation 2. Both the independent and dependent variables 
will be weighted using the weight calculated in equation 3 and technology disclosures 
will be regressed on the weighted independent variables included in the OLS equation 
(4). 
             
     |  |     
     
        
   | ̂ |  
   
  
   
 
 
   
 
  
   
       
 
Both OLS and GLS results will be reported along with R-square for OLS models and 
corrected R-square for GLS models. R-squares will be corrected for GLS models using 
the procedure outlined below. 
   
  ̂    ̂    ̅̅ ̅̅  
         ̅̅ ̅̅  
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Appendix VII – SAS code 
ODS HTML CLOSE; /*CLOSES PREVIOUS OUTPUT*/ 
ODS HTML; /*OPENS NEW OUTPUT*/ 
PROC IMPORT OUT= WORK.AUTM  
            DATAFILE= "C:\Users\justila\Google Drive\Hatch\Data\SAS\New  
folder\DATA2.xlsx"  
            DBMS=EXCEL REPLACE; 
     RANGE="AUTMA$";  
     GETNAMES=YES; 
     MIXED=NO; 
     SCANTEXT=YES; 
     USEDATE=YES; 
     SCANTIME=YES; 
RUN; 
/*CREATE AVERAGE VARIABLES*/ 
DATA AVG; 
SET AUTM; 
ALICFTE=LICFTE/5; 
AOTHFTE=OTHFTE/5; 
ATOTFTE=TOTFTE/5; 
ATOTEXP=TOTEXP/5; 
ATOTEXP1MIL=TOTEXP1MIL/5; 
AFEDEXP=FEDEXP/5; 
AFEDEXP1MIL=FEDEXP1MIL/5; 
AINDEXP=INDEXP/5; 
AINDEXP1MIL=INDEXP1MIL/5; 
ALCTOTLIC=LCTOTLIC/5; 
ALCTOTOPT=LCTOTOPT/5; 
ALCINVDIS=LCINVDIS/5; 
ALCEXCL=LCEXCL/5; 
ALCNEX=LCNEX/5; 
ALGEXCL=LGEXCL/5; 
ALGNEX=LGNEX/5; 
ASMEXCL=SMEXCL/5; 
ASMNEX=SMNEX/5; 
ASUEXCL=SUEXCL/5; 
ASUNEX=SUNEX/5; 
ALCEXEQ=LCEXEQ/5; 
AACTLIC=ACTLIC/5; 
ALCEXSU=LCEXSU/5; 
ALCEXSM=LCEXSM/5; 
ARESFND=RESFND/5; 
ARESFND1MIL=RESFND1MIL/5; 
ALCGNLI=LCGNLI/5; 
ALCGNRR=LCGNRR/5; 
ALC1M=LC1M/5; 
ALCEXEC=LCEXEC/5; 
ALIRECD=LIRECD/5; 
ALIRECD1MIL=LIRECD1MIL/5; 
ALIRUNR=LIRUNR/5; 
ALIRUNR1MIL=LIRUNR1MIL/5; 
ACAINEQ=CAINEQ/5; 
ACAINEQ1MIL=CAINEQ1MIL/5; 
ALIOTHR=LIOTHR/5; 
ALIOTHR1MIL=LIOTHR1MIL/5; 
ALIPDIN=LIPDIN/5; 
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ALIPDIN1MIL=LIPDIN1MIL/5; 
AEXPLGF=EXPLGF/5; 
AEXPLGF1MIL=EXPLGF1MIL/5; 
AREIMLG=REIMLG/5; 
AREIMLG1MIL=REIMLG1MIL/5; 
AINVDIS=INVDIS/5; 
AINVDIS_CLOSED=INVDIS_CLOSED/5; 
AINVDIS_CUM_CLOSED=INVDIS_CUM_CLOSED/5; 
AINVDIS_CUM_CLOSED_NOTACTIVE=INVDIS_CUM_CLOSED_NOTACTIVE/5; 
ATECH=TECH/5; 
ATPTAPP=TPTAPP/5; 
ANPTAPP=NPTAPP/5; 
ANPTAPPNUS=NPTAPPNUS/5; 
ANPTAPPPR=NPTAPPPR/5; 
ANPTAPPUT=NPTAPPUT/5; 
AUSPTIS=USPTIS/5; 
ASTRTUP=STRTUP/5; 
ASTRTUPNO=STRTUPNO/5; 
ASTRTUPINS=STRTUPINS/5; 
ASTRTUPSBIR=STRTUPSBIR/5; 
ASTRTUPFF=STRTUPFF/5; 
ASTRTUPANG=STRTUPANG/5; 
ASTRTUPANET=STRTUPANET/5; 
ASTRTUPSF=STRTUPSF/5; 
ASTRTUPVC=STRTUPVC/5; 
ASTRTUPCP=STRTUPCP/5; 
ASTRTUPOTH=STRTUPOTH/5; 
ASTRTHS=STRTHS/5; 
ASTRNOP=STRNOP/5; 
ASTOPCM=STOPCM/5; 
ASTUPEQ=STUPEQ/5; 
ALTAV=LTAV/5; 
RUN; 
/***************CREATE LOG VARIABLES AND RUN LOG *********************/ 
/*DATA LOG; 
SET AVG; 
LINVDIS=LOG(AINVDIS); 
LSQUALITY=LOG(SQUALITY); 
LSCIPHD=LOG(SCIPHD); 
LTOTEXP1MIL=LOG(ATOTEXP1MIL); 
RUN; 
/************************LOG EQUATION ********************************/ 
/*PROC REG DATA=LOG; 
MODEL LINVDIS=LSQUALITY LSCIPHD LTOTEXP1MIL/SPEC WHITE; 
OUTPUT OUT=LOGB 
 p=LINVDISHAT 
 r=LINVDISRESID; 
TITLE 'LOG UNIVERSITY DISCLOSURES LOG-LOG FUNCTION'; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=LOG; 
VAR LINVDIS LSQUALITY LSCIPHD LTOTEXP1MIL; 
TITLE 'LOG UNIVERSITY DISCLOSURES LOG-LOG CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/***************MODEL 1C DISCLOSURES WITH TTO ************************/ 
PROC REG DATA=AVG; 
MODEL AINVDIS=SQUALITY SCIPHD ATOTFTE HUNTHAVG BENEFIT ATOTEXP1MIL; 
OUTPUT OUT=CC 
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 p=AINVDISHAT 
 r=AINVDISRESID; 
TITLE '1C UNIVERSITY DISCLOSURES WITH TTO AGE AND REWARDS'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=CC; 
VAR AINVDISRESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=AVG; 
VAR AINVDIS SQUALITY SCIPHD ATOTFTE HUNTHAVG BENEFIT ATOTEXP1MIL; 
TITLE '1C UNIVERSITY DISCLOSURES WITH TTO AGE AND REWARDS 
CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*CREATE LOG OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA I; 
SET CC; 
ABSR=ABS(AINVDISRESID); 
RUN; 
DATA I; 
SET I; 
LNABSR=LOG(ABSR); 
RUN; 
/*REGRESS OF RESIDUALS AGAINST INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=I; 
MODEL LNABSR=SQUALITY SCIPHD ATOTFTE HUNTHAVG BENEFIT ATOTEXP1MIL; 
OUTPUT OUT=I 
 p=LNABSRHAT 
 r=LNABSRRESID; 
TITLE '1C UNIVERSITY DISCLOSURES WITH TTO AGE AND REWARDS LOG DEPENDENT 
AGAINST INDEPENDENT VARIABLES'; 
RUN; 
/*TAKE ANTILOG OF LNABSRHAT**/ 
DATA I; 
SET I; 
AR=EXP(LNABSRHAT); 
RUN; 
/*CREATE NEW PREDICTORS DIVIDED BY ERROR TERMS*/ 
DATA I; 
SET I; 
INT=1; 
INVDISA=AINVDIS/AR; 
SQUALITYA=SQUALITY/AR; 
SCIPHDA=SCIPHD/AR; 
TOTFTEA=ATOTFTE/AR;  
HUNTHAVGA=HUNTHAVG/AR; 
BENEFITA=BENEFIT/AR; 
TOTEXP1MILA=ATOTEXP1MIL/AR; 
RUN; 
DATA I; 
SET I; 
INTA=INT/AR; 
RUN; 
/*DATA B; 
SET B; 
LABEL INVDISA='TOTAL DISCLOSURES'; 
LABEL INTA='INTERCEPT'; 
LABEL SQUALITYA='UNIVERSITY QUALITY'; 
LABEL SCIPHDA='PHD GRANTING DEPARTMENTS'; 
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LABEL TOTEXP1MILA='TOTAL RESEARCH EXPENDITURES PER $1 MILLION'; 
RUN; 
/*MODEL 1 WITH INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES DIVIDED BY ERROR 
TERMS*/ 
PROC REG DATA=I; 
MODEL INVDISA=INTA SQUALITYA SCIPHDA TOTFTEA HUNTHAVGA BENEFITA 
TOTEXP1MILA/NOINT; 
OUTPUT OUT=CCC 
 p=INVDISAHAT 
 r=INVDISARESID; 
TITLE '1C TOTAL DISCLOSURES WITH TTO AGE AND REWARDS CORRECTED FOR 
HETEROSCEDASTICITY'; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CCC; 
WEIGHT AR; 
VAR INVDISARESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=I; 
VAR INVDISA SQUALITYA SCIPHDA TOTFTEA HUNTHAVGA BENEFITA TOTEXP1MILA; 
TITLE '1C HETEROSCEDASTIC CORRECTED CORRELATIONS FOR MODEL 1C'; 
RUN; 
/*********************MEANS FOR MODELS *************************/ 
PROC CORR DATA=AVG; 
VAR ALCTOTLIC ALIRECD1MIL ALCGNLI ALCEXEQ AACTLIC ASTRTUP  ALCEXEC; 
TITLE 'TTO OUTPUT CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*******EQUATION 2A, TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED MODEL *******************/ 
PROC REG DATA=CCC; 
MODEL ALCTOTLIC=TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT 
AINVDIS; 
OUTPUT OUT=CC 
 p=ALCTOTLICHAT 
 r=ALCTOTLICRESID; 
TITLE 'A TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=CC; 
VAR ALCTOTLICRESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CCC; 
VAR ALCTOTLIC ALIRECD1MIL TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG 
BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
TITLE 'A TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA DD; 
SET CC; 
ABSRA=ABS(ALCTOTLICRESID); 
RUN; 
/*LOG OF ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA DD; 
SET DD; 
LNABSRA=LOG(ABSRA); 
RUN; 
/*REGRESS LOG OF ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS AGAINST DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=DD; 
MODEL LNABSRA=TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
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OUTPUT OUT=DD 
 P=LNABSRAHAT 
 R=LNABSRARESID; 
TITLE 'A TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED LOG DEPENDENT AGAINST INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES'; 
RUN; 
/*ANTILOG OF LNABSRHAT*/ 
DATA DD; 
SET DD; 
ARA=EXP(LNABSRAHAT); 
RUN; 
/*CREATE NEW PREDICTORS DIVIDED BY ERROR TERMS*/ 
DATA DD; 
SET DD; 
LCTOTLICA=ALCTOTLIC/ARA; 
INT=1; 
HUNTHAVGA=HUNTHAVG/ARA; 
TPOLEA =TPOLE/ARA; 
TTOAGEA=TTOAGE/ARA; 
ORGA=ORG/ARA; 
PUBLICA=PUBLIC/ARA; 
LGA=LG/ARA; 
MEDA=MED/ARA; 
BENEFITA=BENEFIT/ARA; 
INVDISA=AINVDIS/ARA; 
RUN; 
DATA DD; 
SET DD; 
INTA=INT/ARA; 
RUN; 
/*DATA C; 
SET C; 
LABEL LCTOTLICA='TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED'; 
LABEL INTA='INTERCEPT'; 
LABEL HUNTHAVGA='AVG DIST TO INVENTOR AT $100,000'; 
LABEL TPOLEA ='TECH POLE AVERAGE'; 
LABEL TTOAGEA='TTO AGE IN YEARS'; 
LABEL ORGA='MISSION CLARITY'; 
LABEL PUBLICA='PUBLIC VS PRIVATE (1=PUBLIC)'; 
LABEL LGA='LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY'; 
LABEL MEDA='MEDICAL SCHOOL IN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM'; 
LABEL BENEFITA='DISTRIBUTION TO INVENTOR DEPARTMENT'; 
LABEL INVDISHATA='ESTIMATED INVENTION DISCLOSURES'; 
RUN;*/ 
/*NEW REGRESSION OF WEIGHTED LICENSES AGAINST WEIGHTED INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=DD; 
MODEL LCTOTLICA=INTA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA HUNTHAVGA 
BENEFITA INVDISA /NOINT; 
OUTPUT OUT=CCC 
 p=LCTOTLICAHAT 
 r=LCTOTLICARESID; 
TITLE 'A TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED CORRECTED FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=CCC; 
VAR LCTOTLICARESID; 
RUN; 
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PROC CORR DATA=DD; 
VAR LCTOTLICA HUNTHAVGA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA BENEFITA 
INVDISA; 
TITLE 'A TOTAL LICENSES EXECTUED HETEROSCEDASTIC CORRECTED 
CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*********EQUATION 2B, LICENSE INCOME RECEIVED INITIATED MODEL *******/ 
PROC REG DATA=CCC; 
MODEL ALIRECD1MIL=TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT 
AINVDIS; 
OUTPUT OUT=N 
 p=ALIRECD1MILHAT 
 r=ALIRECD1MILRESID; 
TITLE 'B LICENSE INCOME RECEIVED INITIAL MODEL'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=N; 
VAR ALIRECD1MILRESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CCC; 
VAR ALCTOTLIC ALIRECD1MIL TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG 
BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
TITLE 'B LICENSE INCOME RECEIVED CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA N; 
SET N; 
ABSR=ABS(ALIRECD1MILRESID); 
RUN; 
/*LOG OF ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA N; 
SET N; 
LNABSR=LOG(ABSR); 
RUN; 
/*REGRESS LOG OF ABS OF RESIDUALS AGAINST INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=N; 
MODEL LNABSR=TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
OUTPUT OUT=N 
 P=LNABSRHAT 
 R=LNABSRRESID; 
TITLE 'B LICENSE INCOME RECEIVED LOG DEPENDENT AGAINST INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES'; 
RUN; 
/*ANTILOG OF LNABSRHAT*/ 
DATA N; 
SET N; 
AR=EXP(LNABSRHAT); 
RUN; 
/*CREATE WEIGHTED VARIABLES*/ 
DATA N; 
SET N; 
LIRECD1MILA=ALIRECD1MIL/AR; 
INT=1; 
HUNTHAVGA=HUNTHAVG/AR; 
TPOLEA =TPOLE/AR; 
TTOAGEA=TTOAGE/AR; 
ORGA=ORG/AR; 
PUBLICA=PUBLIC/AR; 
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LGA=LG/AR; 
MEDA=MED/AR; 
BENEFITA=BENEFIT/AR; 
INVDISA=AINVDIS/AR; 
RUN; 
DATA N; 
SET N; 
INTA=INT/AR; 
RUN; 
/*DATA F; 
SET F; 
LABEL LCTOTLICA='TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED'; 
LABEL INTA='INTERCEPT'; 
LABEL HUNTHAVGA='AVG DIST TO INVENTOR AT $100,000'; 
LABEL TPOLEA ='TECH POLE AVERAGE'; 
LABEL TTOAGEA='TTO AGE IN YEARS'; 
LABEL ORGA='MISSION CLARITY'; 
LABEL PUBLICA='PUBLIC VS PRIVATE (1=PUBLIC)'; 
LABEL LGA='LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY'; 
LABEL MEDA='MEDICAL SCHOOL IN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM'; 
LABEL BENEFITA='DISTRIBUTION TO INVENTOR DEPARTMENT'; 
LABEL INVDISHATA='ESTIMATED INVENTION DISCLOSURES'; 
RUN;*/ 
/*REGRESS WEIGHTED LICENSES GENERATING INCOME AGAINST WEIGHTED 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=N; 
MODEL LIRECD1MILA=INTA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA HUNTHAVGA 
BENEFITA INVDISA /NOINT; 
OUTPUT OUT=NN 
 P=LIRECD1MILAHAT 
 R=LIRECD1MILARESID; 
TITLE 'B LICENSE INCOME RECEIVED CORRECTED FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=NN; 
VAR LIRECD1MILARESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=N; 
VAR LIRECD1MILA HUNTHAVGA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA BENEFITA 
INVDISA; 
TITLE 'B LICENSE INCOME RECEIVED HETEROSCEDASTIC CORRECTED 
CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*******EQUATION 2C, LICENSES GENERATING INCOME MODEL ****************/ 
PROC REG DATA=CCC; 
MODEL ALCGNLI=TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
OUTPUT OUT=F 
 p=ALCGNLIHAT 
 r=ALCGNLIRESID; 
TITLE 'C LICENSES GENERATING INCOME INITIAL MODEL'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=F; 
VAR ALCGNLIRESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CCC; 
VAR ALCGNLI HUNTHAVG TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
TITLE 'C LICENSES GENERATING INCOME CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
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/*ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA F; 
SET F; 
ABSR=ABS(ALCGNLIRESID); 
RUN; 
/*LOG OF ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA F; 
SET F; 
LNABSR=LOG(ABSR); 
RUN; 
/*REGRESS LOG OF ABS OF RESIDUALS AGAINST INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=F; 
MODEL LNABSR=TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
OUTPUT OUT=F 
 P=LNABSRHAT 
 R=LNABSRRESID; 
TITLE 'C LICENSES GERNERATING INCOME LOG DEPENDENT AGAINST INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES'; 
RUN; 
/*ANTILOG OF LNABSRHAT*/ 
DATA F; 
SET F; 
AR=EXP(LNABSRHAT); 
RUN; 
/*CREATE WEIGHTED VARIABLES*/ 
DATA F; 
SET F; 
LCGNLIA=ALCGNLI/AR; 
INT=1; 
HUNTHAVGA=HUNTHAVG/AR; 
TPOLEA =TPOLE/AR; 
TTOAGEA=TTOAGE/AR; 
ORGA=ORG/AR; 
PUBLICA=PUBLIC/AR; 
LGA=LG/AR; 
MEDA=MED/AR; 
BENEFITA=BENEFIT/AR; 
INVDISA=AINVDIS/AR; 
RUN; 
DATA F; 
SET F; 
INTA=INT/AR; 
RUN; 
/*DATA F; 
SET F; 
LABEL LCTOTLICA='TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED'; 
LABEL INTA='INTERCEPT'; 
LABEL HUNTHAVGA='AVG DIST TO INVENTOR AT $100,000'; 
LABEL TPOLEA ='TECH POLE AVERAGE'; 
LABEL TTOAGEA='TTO AGE IN YEARS'; 
LABEL ORGA='MISSION CLARITY'; 
LABEL PUBLICA='PUBLIC VS PRIVATE (1=PUBLIC)'; 
LABEL LGA='LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY'; 
LABEL MEDA='MEDICAL SCHOOL IN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM'; 
LABEL BENEFITA='DISTRIBUTION TO INVENTOR DEPARTMENT'; 
LABEL INVDISHATA='ESTIMATED INVENTION DISCLOSURES'; 
RUN;*/ 
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/*REGRESS WEIGHTED LICENSES GENERATING INCOME AGAINST WEIGHTED 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=F; 
MODEL LCGNLIA=INTA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA HUNTHAVGA 
BENEFITA INVDISA /NOINT; 
OUTPUT OUT=FF 
 p=LCGNLIAHAT 
 r=LCGNLIARESID; 
TITLE 'C LICENSES GENERATING INCOME CORRECTED FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=FF; 
VAR LCGNLIARESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=F; 
VAR LCGNLIA HUNTHAVGA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA BENEFITA 
INVDISA; 
TITLE 'C LICENSES GENERATING INCOME HETEROSCEDASTIC CORRECTED 
CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*********EQUATION 2E, CUMULATIVE ACTIVE LICENSES MODEL **************/ 
PROC REG DATA=CCC; 
MODEL AACTLIC= TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
OUTPUT OUT=J 
 p=AACTLICHAT 
 r=AACTLICRESID; 
TITLE 'E CUMULATIVE ACTIVE LICENSES INITIAL MODEL'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=J; 
VAR AACTLICRESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CCC; 
VAR AACTLIC HUNTHAVG TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
TITLE 'E CUMULATIVE ACTIVE LICENSES CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/*ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA J; 
SET J; 
ABSR=ABS(AACTLICRESID); 
RUN; 
/*LOG OF ABSOLUTE VALUE OF RESIDUALS*/ 
DATA J; 
SET J; 
LNABSR=LOG(ABSR); 
RUN; 
/*REGRESS LOG OF ABS OF RESIDUALS AGAINST INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=J; 
MODEL LNABSR=TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
OUTPUT OUT=J 
 P=LNABSRHAT 
 R=LNABSRRESID; 
TITLE 'E CUMULATIVE ACTIVE LICENSES LOG DEPENDENT AGAINST INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES'; 
RUN; 
/*ANTILOG OF LNABSRHAT*/ 
DATA J; 
SET J; 
AR=EXP(LNABSRHAT); 
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RUN; 
/*CREATE WEIGHTED VARIABLES*/ 
DATA J; 
SET J; 
ACTLICA=AACTLIC/AR; 
INT=1; 
HUNTHAVGA=HUNTHAVG/AR; 
TPOLEA =TPOLE/AR; 
TTOAGEA=TTOAGE/AR; 
ORGA=ORG/AR; 
PUBLICA=PUBLIC/AR; 
LGA=LG/AR; 
MEDA=MED/AR; 
BENEFITA=BENEFIT/AR; 
INVDISA=AINVDIS/AR; 
RUN; 
DATA J; 
SET J; 
INTA=INT/AR; 
RUN; 
/*DATA F; 
SET F; 
LABEL LCTOTLICA='TOTAL LICENSES EXECUTED'; 
LABEL INTA='INTERCEPT'; 
LABEL HUNTHAVGA='AVG DIST TO INVENTOR AT $100,000'; 
LABEL TPOLEA ='TECH POLE AVERAGE'; 
LABEL TTOAGEA='TTO AGE IN YEARS'; 
LABEL ORGA='MISSION CLARITY'; 
LABEL PUBLICA='PUBLIC VS PRIVATE (1=PUBLIC)'; 
LABEL LGA='LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY'; 
LABEL MEDA='MEDICAL SCHOOL IN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM'; 
LABEL BENEFITA='DISTRIBUTION TO INVENTOR DEPARTMENT'; 
LABEL INVDISHATA='ESTIMATED INVENTION DISCLOSURES'; 
RUN;*/ 
/*REGRESS WEIGHTED LICENSES GENERATING INCOME AGAINST WEIGHTED 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES*/ 
PROC REG DATA=J; 
MODEL ACTLICA=INTA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA HUNTHAVGA 
BENEFITA INVDISA /NOINT; 
OUTPUT OUT=JJ 
 P=ACTLICAHAT 
 R=ACTLICARESID; 
TITLE 'E CUMULATIVE ACTIVE LICENSES CORRECTED FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY'; 
RUN; 
PROC MEANS DATA=JJ; 
VAR ACTLICARESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=J; 
VAR ACTLICA HUNTHAVGA TPOLEA TTOAGEA ORGA PUBLICA LGA MEDA BENEFITA 
INVDISA; 
TITLE 'E CUMULATIVE ACTIVE LICENSES HETEROSCEDASTIC CORRECTED 
CORRELATIONS'; 
RUN; 
/******TEST RESIDUALS OF 1C AND 2A FOR CORRELATION********************/ 
DATA CCC; 
SET CCC; 
LCTOTLICARESIDA=LCTOTLICARESID*ARA; 
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INVDISARESIDA=INVDISARESID*AR; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CC; 
VAR AINVDISRESID ALCTOTLICRESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CCC; 
VAR INVDISARESID LCTOTLICARESID; 
RUN; 
PROC CORR DATA=CCC; 
VAR INVDISARESIDA LCTOTLICARESIDA; 
RUN; 
PROC GPLOT DATA=CCC; 
PLOT INVDISARESIDA*LCTOTLICARESIDA; 
RUN; 
/*******CORRELATIONS FOR MODELS 2C THROUGH ***************************/ 
PROC CORR DATA=AVG; 
VAR ALCTOTLIC ALIRECD1MIL ALCGNLI AACTLIC TPOLE TTOAGE ORG PUBLIC LG 
MED HUNTHAVG BENEFIT AINVDIS; 
RUN; 
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